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NOTES
THE TRIAL JUDGE'S SATISFACTION AS TO
VOLUNTARINESS AND UNDERSTANDING OF
GUILTY PLEAS
I. INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, shortly after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure was amended, the Quarterly published a student note which
made a detailed study of the various methods employed by trial court
judges, when so required by state and federal law, to satisfy themselves
that there is a factual basis for a tendered guilty plea.' That article, along
with numerous others published throughout the country in the last 10
years, reflected the legal community's growing recognition that guilty
pleas, and not trial, serve as the major mechanism for disposition of
criminal defendants.2 The Quarterly note revealed, at least in part, that
the guilty plea process at that time and on both the state and federal
1. Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH.
U .L Q 306. Rule I I itself provides:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere.
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of
nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the
plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or
if a defendant fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not
enter ajudgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the
plea.
FED R CRIM. P. 11.
2 Eg., THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE-THE TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE
COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE: COURTS]; Note, The TrialJudge's Satisfaction as
to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 306. The President's Commission stated:
Most cases are disposed of outside the traditional trial process, either by a decision not to
charge a suspect with a criminal offense or by a plea of guilty. In many communities between
one-third and one-half of the cases begun by arrest are disposed of by some form of dismissal
by police, prosecutor, or judge. When a decision is made to prosecute, it is estimated that in
many courts as many as ninety percent of all convictions are obtained by guilty pleas.
TASK FORCE: COURTS 4. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE
METROPOLIS 97-112, 132-35 (D. McIntyre, Jr. ed. 1967); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION
TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (1969); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF
GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (1966); Clark, An Indorsement of Federal Rules of
Evidence, 5 F.R.D. 305, 307 (1946).
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1vels -was shaped by the vague standards of "voluntariness" and
limited, in large measure, only by the broad discretion of the trial judge
in accepting tendered pleas.3 In the abstract, this flexible approach to
acceptance of guilty pleas in the neutral atmosphere of a trial court
offered seemingly ample protection for pleading defendants.
Pragmatically however, flexibility in under-staffed courts with crowded
dockets often led to cursory examinations of pleading defendants by trial
judges at arraignment, and sometimes, to no examination at all.
Although the cause and effect relationship is unclear, appellate courts
were at the same time confronting an increasingly large number of
appeals and collateral attacks by convicted defendants seeking to
invalidate their earlier pleas of guilty.4 Because the trial records on
3. Note, The Trial Judge's Satisfaction as to the Factual Basis of Guilty Pleas, 1966 WASH.
U.L.Q. 306.
4. Indeed, the more stringent requirements imposed by the McCarthy and Boykin decisions in
1969-specifically that voluntariness or compliance with Rule I I requirements be determined on the
record (see notes 7-8 infra and accompanying text)-were in part motivated by a desire to cure the
burden created by these appeals. The majority opinion in McCarthy. for example, stated:
To the extent that the district judge thus exposes the defendant's state of mind on the record
through personal interrogation, he not only facilitates his own determination of a guilty
plea's voluntariness, but he also facilitates that determination in any subsequent post-
conviction proceeding based upon a claim that the plea was involuntary.
the more meticulously the Rule is adhered to, the more it tends to discourage, or at least
enable more expeditious disposition of, the numerous and often frivolous post-conviction
attacks on the constitutional validity of guilty pleas.
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467, 465 (1969). In adopting nine areas of minimum
arraignment inquiry, the Delaware Supreme Court echoed this concern:
The requisite record can be made with little effort and without wastage of time. On the other
hand, if the record discloses the above the set offacts. appeals such as the current one will be
avoided or at least be subject to summary decision, and we suppose that Federal Habeas
Corpus proceedings could be more easily disposed of. Also the making of such a record by
the.court protects the defense counsel from the charge, easily made but difficult to refute,
that the defendant was not sufficiently advised by his counsel of his rights, of the nature of
the charge and of the consequences of the guilty plea. (Emphasis added)
Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969). See also Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d 604,607
(4th Cir. 1961). The choice of an absolute requirement of a record of voluntariness resolved a
conflict among federal courts, adopting the rule in Heiden v. United States, 353 F.2d 53 (9th Cir.
1965). Judge Merrill stated in Heiden:
There is no question but that the record [in the hearing granted by the district court on
petitioner's motion to vacate judgment and sentence] amply supports the court's findings
and supplies a basis for disbelief of the appellant. The question is whether such findings can
suffice to eliminate prejudice resulting from failure of the court, at the time of arraignment
and waiver of counsel, to make the necessary ascertainment of understanding. In our
judgment, they do not.
Id. at 54. Prior to Boykin and McCarthy, the notion that a "silent record" was "prejudicial as a
matter of law"-generally referred to as the Heiden rule-was rejected by other courts. E.g.,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/3
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challenged pleas were largely barren of any affirmative showing of
voluntariness, other than perhaps the defendant's unresisting presence
before the trial judge, the most unimaginative of convicted defendants
was able to make allegations sufficient to, at least, require a hearing.5
These hearings, which served mostly as arraignments de novo, were
naturally time-consuming, and frequently required a second
appointment of counsel. In addition, they occasionally revealed that the
flexibility of the trial court guilty plea process permitted improvident
and involuntary pleas to pass through arraignment unimpeded by even
the most simple of inquiries to a defendant which might have revealed
impermissable pressures or ignorance.' The Supreme Court responded to
this problem in two landmark decisions in the 1968 Term. In McCarthy
v. United States,7 the Court held, ostensibly as a part of their supervisory
power over the federal system, that failure of a federal trial judge to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 is automatic
reversible error. That Rule, as amended in 1966, requires federal trial
judges, before the acceptance of a guilty plea, to "address the defendant
personally" and determine "that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea." In addition, Rule 11 requires that "The court shall not enter a
Arnold v. United States, 359 F2d 425 (3rd Cir. 1966); Brokan v. United States, 368 F2d 508 (4th
Cir 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 996 (1967); Weed v. United States, 360 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1966);
France v. United States, 358 F2d946 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 872 (1967).
But cj' People v. Chasco, 276 Cal. App. 317, _ 80 Cal. Rptr. 667, 671 (1969), cert. denied,
397 U S. 1052 (1970) (expressing that there is frequently a court interest in expediting trials over
avoiding appeals and that, in many cases, "[a] searching factual hearing on habeas corpus is far
more likely to establish the true nature of a purported waiver of a constitutional right than are
formula responses made during the trial").
5 See note 4 supra. Cf. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
6 This occured in spite of a recognition that the arraignment was the most appropriate forum for
the determination:
Little time is required to make the needed inquiry to determine whether the action of the
accused is taken voluntarily and with proper understanding. Obviously the best time to
conduct the inquiry is, as the rule contemplates, at the time when the right to counsel is being
waived or when the guilty plea is offered.
Aiken v. United States, 296 F2d 604, 607 (4th Cir. 1961). And it occured in spite of a similar
recognition that, at least, voluntariness was required of any guilty plea. See note 31 infra and
accompanying text. The generally recognized authority for the notion that voluntariness is a
requirement of constitutional due process is Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). It
should be noted that this decision antedates widespread modern recognition that due process
requirements extend to and limit the states. There is no actual Supreme Court extension of the
voluntariness requirement but, rather, widespread state acceptance anticipated the requirement
which Boykin implicitly recognizes. See notes 8-13 infra and accompanying text.
7 394 U.S.459 (1969).
Vol. 1970:289]
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judgment on a plea of guilty uhless it is satisfied that there is a factual
basis for the plea." Although the Court in McCarthy discounted that its
decision applied to state procedures, less than two months later the
Court, in Boykin v. Alabama,' imposed similar requirements on state
courts. The Court in Boykin held that a valid state criminal conviction
based on a plea of guilty requires an affirmative showing on the trial
court record that the defendant's plea was given voluntarily and with
understanding. Boykin, while clearly intended to bring some formality
and uniformity into the guilty plea process, left several questions
unanswered. First, the Court did not state that Rule 11 requirements for
on the record determinations were applicable to the states.9 Thus,
because the decision was directed at the voluntariness of the offered plea,
there is some doubt whether state courts must inquire into the factual
basis of the plea to determine its accuracy."0 Second, Boykin did not
involve a deficient on the record examination, but instead, revealed that
no examination was made of the defendant at the time of the plea. As a
result, the Court was required to decide only generally that due process
requires:
• . . the utmost solicitude of which the courts are capable in canvassing
the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of
what the plea connotes and of its consequences."
Thus,' because no canvassing was made in Boykin, reversal was
automatic. No attempt was made in Boykin to detail what inquiries
should or might be made by a trial court to accomplish an acceptable
"canvassing" of tendered guilty pleas. Moreover, McCarthy does little
to suggest any similar guidelines to federal courts beyond the general
language of Rule 11. Both decisions have instead, in effect, delegated to
lower trial and appellate courts the responsibility for development of a
more comprehensive arraignment inquiry for the acceptance of guilty
pleas. Boykin does suggest that on the record "canvassing" should
accomplish at least two tasks: assure that a defendant does not
8. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
9. Id.passim.
10. But see Id. at 244 (Harlan, J. dissenting). Harlan views Boykin as"... in effect fasten[ing]
upon the States, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the rigid prophylactic requirements of
Rule I I of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. at 245. Also see, e.g., State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542,547 (Iowa 1969). Accuracy determinations have been required in several states without
reference to Boykin, see, e.g., People v' Taylor, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970) [reversing
People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 33, 155 N.W.2d 723 (1968) for failure to adequately inquire as to
accuracy].
11. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,243-44 (1969).
[Vol. 1970:289
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improvidently or involuntarily waive his constitutional right to jury trial,
right to confront witnesses, and privilege against self-incrimination;12
and, facilitate and deter appellate and collateral proceedings on the
plea. 3 This note is, in part, designed to suggest what inquiries ought to
be made by a trial judge to best accomplish these tasks.
The body of the note is constructed from three separate studies. First,
the Quarterly staff made a study of the actual current arraignment
procedures used in the acceptance of guilty pleas in both state and
federal courts sitting in St. Louis. The value of this empirical data is
two-fold: it reveals the average scope of inquiry made of a pleading
defendant after Boykin and McCarthy and thus invites comparison with
what appellate decisions suggest should be occuring; and it reveals the
impact (or in numerous instances lack of influence) of the Supreme
Court's decisions. Second, the Quarterly, through the use of a "model
arraignment questionnaire", sought out the viewpoints of a large
number of persons dealing directly with the guilty plea process, including
trial and appellate judges (both state and federal), legal aid lawyers,
public defenders, general practitioners, prosecutors and law professors.
These individuals were asked to weigh the necessity and value of a
number of potential areas of arraignment inquiry. Their responses are,
as with the empirical study of the local courts, of two-fold value: they
reflect indirectly what is thought ought to be the "law" and additionally
permit what is at times a striking comparison of viewpoint between
individuals serving in different capacities within the criminal justice
system. In large measure, this comparison suggests that the development
of any agreed-upon standard for arraignment inquiries into
voluntariness of a plea will be a far less simple task than might be
supposed. Third, the Quarterly made what is hoped to be a near-
exhaustive study of the appellate case law deciding or implying what
should be generally inquired into by the trial judge. In addition to those
cases dealing directly with what must appear in the record under
McCarthy and Boykin, the note includes in its research a large number
of decisions decided prior to Boykin and McCarthy. These cases are
included to assist in defining with clarity what the various aspects of a
voluntary guilty plea are, which in turn suggests what must or might be
canvassed by a trial court when taking a plea of guilty.
At the outset, a word of caution seems necessary. The structure of this
12 -d. at 243.
13 Id. at 244.
Vol. 1970:2891
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note will probably facilitate the easy development of arraignment
questionnaires for trial court use. In fact, to assist in that task, several
questionnaires and forms used in a number of trial courts throughout the
country are included in an appendix. Use of a questionnaire by a trial
judge does not seem to be, in itself, inadvisable. Quite to the contrary,
the results of the empirical data collected on the St. Louis courts suggest
that the judges are not, but ought to be, using some written guides. The
fault of a questionnaire lies in the ease by which its use can slip into a
mechanistic, prophylactic procedure with its user becoming an inactive
participant.1 4 The questionnaire can be no better than the judge using it.
The defendant's responses to a set of questions can be relatively
meaningless unless the trial judge uses those responses to sense what lies
below the surface. Sincerity and competence can not be built into a
questionnaire, and no attempt has been made in this note to suggest how
that might be done. Finally, this note does not consider what means can
or should be used to determine if a faciual basis for a plea of guilty
exists. That project was accomplished by the earlier Quarterly note, and
that note should be viewed as the complement to this project.
II. THE MODEL ARRAIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
A. Methodology
A questionnaire, labeled a "model arraignment questionnaire", was
mailed in July of 1970 to over 200 persons connected with or interested
in the guilty plea process.
FIGURE 1
MODEL ARRAIGNMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
The following are areas of inquiry, and in some instances specific questions, which might be
pursued by a judge prior to his acceptance of a plea of guilty-primarily to accurately ascertain
whether the defendant is understandably waiving his Constitutional right to an impartial jury trial,
his right against self-incrimination, and in the appropriate case, his right to counsel.
Each question is to be rated on a scale of I to 5 according to your assessment of the value and
appropriateness of the question in determining the voluntariness and accuracy of the plea. I
represents that class of questions which are so valuable and appropriate as to be absolutely
necessary inquiries in every case. 5, on the other hand, designates that category of questions which
are never of any value. 2, 3, and 4 designate degrees of value between the two ranges of absolutely
necessary and absolutely unnecessary.
Your assessment of each category should not involve any consideration of the possible form of the
14. See People v. Taylor, 383 Mich. 338, -.. , 175 N.W.2d 715, 733 (1970) (Adams, J.,
concurring); cf. People v. Chasco, 276 Cal. App. 317, _ 80 Cal. Rptr. 667,670-71 (1969).
[Vol. 1970:289
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/3
Vol. 1970:289] VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEAS
question, but rather, should be solely an evaluation of the relevance and worth of the information
,ought
(; \ I R IL COMf PETENC("
il) Personal Data (including such things as age. education, employ- (1)_(2)_(3)__(4)_(5)_
ment, and marital status)
12) Mental Health (tor example: whether subject to any prior treat- (1)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
ment for a mental disorder)
03 Additions, Narcotic or Alcoholic (1)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(4) Prior Convictions (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
NL % T RI.\ ESS-KO WLEDGE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLEA
(0) Are you voluntarily and understandably entering this plea? (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(0,) I-brcats, Covercion, Duress (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
17) -1 hreat, of prosecution of others (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(8) Prom ises of sentence concessions (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(9 Pica Bargains 'ith prosecutor (I)_(2)_(3)4(4)_(5)_
(10) Specific Maximum and Minimum Sentence Range
(II) Concurrent and/or Consecutive Sentencing Possibilities
S% here appropriate)
12 ) Parole Eligibility (especially if limited or not available) (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(It1) Qualification under special sentencing statutes (such as
Habitual Offender or Youthful Offender statutes)
(141 C ollateral Consequences of Plea (such as loss of voting (I)(2)(3)_4)(5)__
privilege)
1 ( on'titutional Right to Impartial Jury' (I)_(2)_(3)_(4) _(5)__
(16) C onstitutional Right to Confront and Cross-Examine (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
his Accusers
(17) Constitutional Right Against Self-incrimination (I_ _
18O) C onstitutional Right to Compulsory Process for Witnesses (1)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(9I)) Specific Nature of the Charges in the Indictment
020) I-esser Included Offences (I)(2).(3)_4) __(5)__
211) C rcumstances Under Which a Plea May be Withdrawn (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(22) 1 xtent of Consultation with Counsel re all the Above (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
(23) [ tcnt of Defendant's Understanding that Judge not (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
Bound to Honor Recommendations of Prosecutor
W 111 I R OF COL\SEL (where applicable)
(24) C onstitutional Right to Assistance by Counsel (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
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(25) Whether defendant understands that an attorney could better (I)_(2)_(3)__(4)_(5)_
ascertain admissability of evidence against the defen-
dant and is better equipped to prevent the admission of
illegally obtained evidence in trial
(26) Whether defendant understands that an attorney is capable (I)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
of discovering other defences to the charges and for
the presentation of mitigating circumstances to the Court
(27) Any Threats or Promises in Return for the Waiver of Ap- (1)_(2)_(3)_(4)_(5)_
pointment of an Attorney
(28) PLEASE LIST HERE AND EVALUATE AS ABOVE ANY
OTHER QUESTIONS OR AREAS OF INQUIRY
YOU FEEL SHOULD OR MIGHT BE PURSUED:
Addresses were randomly selected from national directories such as
Martindale-Hubbell. Selection was designed, however, to include
representatives of each state and every federal circuit. The sample, as
previously mentioned, consisted of trial judges (state and federal),
United States Attorneys, appellate judges (state and federal), Public
Defenders, Legal Aid Attorneys, general practitioners in the field of
criminal representation, and law professors with teaching experience in
criminal justice administration. Each respondent was instructed to
classify each area of inquiry listed on the questionnaire into a range
between "absolutely necessary" and "absolutely unnecessary". The
questionnaire did not include any hypothetical defendant or set of
circumstances to guide the respondents. Instead, the respondents were
required to assess the value of the inquiries much as a judge might when
confronting a defendant in an arraignment for the first time. Each of the
five boxes in the absolutely necessary to unnecessary range was assigned
a value on a scale from plus two to minus two. Thus, an indication that
an area of inquiry was "absolutely necessary" in an arraignment prior
to the acceptance of a guilty plea was assigned a value of plus two. An
"absolutely unnecessary" response was weighted minus two, and the
corresponding classifications between were weighted respectively plus
one, zero, or minus one. The averages produced by this assignment of
values reflect whether, and how much, that particular area of inquiry
was considered necessary to the proper acceptance of a guilty plea. The
results of the questionnaire survey are listed in Table 1 below.
[Vol. 1970:289
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B. The ,4reas of Inquiry: Their Legal and Pragmatic Necessity
1. Competency
A defendant incompetent to stand trial is, at least conceptually,
incompetent to convict himself by a plea of guilty or otherwise. As a
result, it is held without exception in the United States that it is
reversible error to accept a plea of guilty from a person not competent to
waive his constitutional rights.'5 The trial judge considering a tendered
plea of guilt has, however, during the short moments of an arraignment,
only one means of making this determination; he must question the
defendant personally." Questions which will require only a "yes" or
.no" response or a nod of the head from a defendant seem ill-suited for
this purpose. Instead, the judge should quickly test the state of mind of
the defendant with questions designed to elicit conversational responses.
Such questions can and should be designed to discover at the same time
information about the defendant which may reflect competency. Among
factors which may help a judge infer competency are age and education.
To the extent that these facts reflect maturity and literacy, these factors
should be of some usefulness, and have been approved as clearly relevant
for an arraignment inquiry in numerous decisions. 17 It should be noted
15 Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). See also Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065, 1067 (5th
Cir 1970) (the constitutional right of a mental incompetent not to stand trial may not be waived by
a guilty plea); State v, Sisco, 169 N.W,2d 542,548 (Iowa 1969) (the court must itself make and may
not delegate the competency determination): 8 J. MOORE. FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.02 [3] (R.
Cipesed 1969).
16 C1 Statev. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,548 (Iowa 1969).
17 See. e g., United States ex rel. B. v. Shelly, 305 F. Supp. 55,58 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ("maturity"
is a factor in determining voluntariness); United States e rel. Bolden v. Rundle, 300 F. Supp. 107
(L D Pa 1969) (relevant to a determination of voluntariness); United States ex rel. Wakeley v.
Russell, 309 F. Supp. 68, 69 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (age and background are among "relevant facts and
circumstances" in finding voluntariness); State v. Linsner, - Ariz.- 467 P.2d 238, 241
(1970) (on appeal, a showing in the record that defendant had one year of college supported the trial
court's finding of a voluntary plea); Normand v. People, 165 Colo. 509, 512, 440 P.2d 282, 283
(1968) (age and intelligence relevant to voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty and waiver of
counsel); People v Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 340, 155 N.W. 2d 723, 727 (1968). rev'd on other
grounds. 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970) (suggests that age, name and extent of education be
asked in an arraignment interrogation); State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126
N W.2d 91, 95 (1965) [suggests that trial courts determine the extent of defendant's education and
general comprehension: made mandatory by Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661 , - 170 N.W.2d 713,
719 (1969)l; ci. United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 303 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D. S.D. 1969) (in
finding in a plea voluntary the court notes with approval an inquiry containing questions as to age
and education). Scholars have similarly supported inquiry into areas included here under thegeneral
heading of competence-defendant's intelligence, education, prior convictions, mental condition,
physical condition and age-as relevant to a determination that the plea is "understandingly"
entered E g., ADVISOR'S COMMITTEE ON THE CRIMINAL TRIAL-ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
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that, particularly if a defendant is youthful, a question about the age of
the defendant will assist in putting the trial judge on notice that the
defendant should be informed of special treatment or sentencing
possibilities, such as the Federal Youth Corrections Act.'
a. Personal Data
Marital situation, employment history, and family life would seem to
be of generally similar worth. Somewhat suprisingly however, they are
rarely considered in appellate decisions reviewing alleged incompetent
pleas." Their value as a means of reducing improvident pleas
nevertheless seems high. For example, if a judge discovers that a
defendant is without any close relatives, he may wish to inquire more
deeply into the motivations for the defendant's plea.2 Likewise, the
judge may discover through this line of questioning that the plea bargain
offered and accepted by a particular defendant is less than that usually
offered to similarly situated defendants. 21
"Personal Data" questions (survey question 1) received responses in
the survey which tended generally toward "necessary". Only in the
categories of appellate judges (both state and federal) and Legal Aid
Attorneys could the responses be interpreted to connote absolute
necessity of inquiry [see Table 1 supra]. The St. Louis court data
indicates that age and education are generally asked at the arraignment;
homelife less frequently; and employment record seldom [see Table 2
infra].
b. Mental Health
Mental incompetence to stand trial is not waived by a plea of guilty.22
A judge may, however, only with difficulty discover a defendant's
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY 26 (1967)
[commentary to § 1.4 (a)] [hereinafter cited as ABA]; Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the
Federal Courts, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 366,374 (1955).,
18. 18 U.S.C. § § 5005 et seq. (1969). See also notes 92-93 infra and accompanying text.
19. But cf. United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Russell, 309 F. Supp. 68,69 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (age and
general background are among "circumstances" by which the court may evaluate
"voluntariness").
20. But see United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970) (on appeal it
was alleged that the guilty plea was substantially a yielding to pressure from the defendant's mother
and hence involuntary: the conviction was upheld as based on a voluntary plea); cf. Endsley v. Cupp,
-Ore._, 459 P.2d 448 (1969).
21. See notes 64-78 infra and accompanying text.
22. Carroll v. Beto, 421 F.2d 1065, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v. Kincaid,
362 F.2d 939 (4th Cir. 1966) (defendant brought his mental condition to the court's attention; on
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mental disability at the arraignment-particularly with questioning as
his only tool. Certain questions suggest themselves as available to key a
judge into, at least, the possibility that an accused lacks mental
competence to plead. For example: "Have you ever been a patient in a
mental hospital or institution?", "Do you now believe or have you ever
believed yourself to be mentally ill or mentally incompetent in any
respect?",23 "Have you ever for any reason consulted or has anyone ever
suggested that you consult a psychiatrist, psychologist or psychiatric
social worker?". Answers to such questions, if affirmative, suggest their
own follow-up inquiry.
The survey answers, again, tended toward "necessary" (survey
question 2) with five categories-federal appellate judges, federal trial
judges, Legal Aid Attorneys, general practitioners, and
professors -indicating the inquiry to be "absolutely necessary" [see
Table I supra]. Questions in this area were seldom asked at
arraignments in St. Louis [see Table 2 infra].
c. Addictions, Narcotic or Alcoholic
Addiction relates to both competency and voluntariness. Generally, it
has not been the pattern to reverse guilty plea convictions on the fact of
addiction, absent supporting evidence, when a defendant alleges having
been under the influence of drugs at the arraignment. 4 The burden of
this notice, the court's failure to adequately assure itself of defendant's mental capacity was error);
United States ex rel. Bresnock v. Rundle, 300 F. Supp. 264 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Ingram v. State, 450
P2d 161 (Alas. 1969); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,548 (Iowa 1969) (indicating the court's non-
delegable duty to determine competence-mental competence in that case); Commonwealth v. Abel,
438 Pa. 423, 265 A 2d 374 (1970) (guilty plea by person without mental capacity to understand his
position is subject to attack as not knowingly and intelligently entered); Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d
226, 231, 172 N.W.2d 664, 666 (1969) (citing as a "good model" an arraignment interrogation
which included a question as to possible prior mental institutionalization); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
art 26,13 (1966) (before a plea may be accepted, the defendant must appear "plainly sane"). Also
see generally Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (conviction of a mental incompetent violates
due process). But see People v. Brown, 41 111. 2d 230,233,242 N.E.2d 242,243 (1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S 1121 (1969) (since no facts were before the court giving it notice of possible mental
incompetence, failure of the trial court to determine sanity is not an allegation sufficient to require a
post-conviction hearing). This and other factors of "competency" are discussed generally in ABA
at 26 and Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Courts, 55 COLuM. L. REv. 366, 373-74
(1955).
23. These questions were suggested by the Minnesota form questions three and four. See
Appendix 11 infra.lmportantly, if a defendant denies such prior history in response to these or like
questions, the trial judge may finesse some types of post-conviction claims, e.g., based on a failure
to hold a competency hearing. United States v. Cooper, 410 F.2d 1128, 1130, rehearing denied, 410
F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1969).
24. See. e g , Grennett v. United States, 403 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (evidence of narcotics use
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proving on later appeal or collateral attack that the plea was made while
under the influence of drugs is on the defendant. 2 On the other hand, the
burden shifts to the state when misinformation, however innocent, is
supplied to the court indicating that the accused is not under the
influence of narcotics and the court fails to inquire into possible drug
influence.26 One of the major purposes of on the record inquiry under
Boykin is to reduce appeals and collateral attacks challenging the
validity of prior pleas of guilty. During the last several years, a
surprisingly large number of collateral attacks have appeared in Federal
Reporters seeking reversal of pleas of guilty because they were made
while the defendant was under the influence of drugs. This suggests that
trial court judges should consider inquiring more frequently into the
drug habits of the defendants before them.
Survey responses indicated that inquiry as to addiction was
"necessary" but only Legal Aid Attorneys and federal appellate judges
felt there was an "absolute" necessity of such inquiry [see Table 1
supra]. Questions in this area were asked frequently in state courts in the
St. Louis area, but not in federal courts [see Table 2 infra].
d. Prior convictions
Prior convictions, for purposes of the questionnaire, were included
under the heading of competency. The usual relevance of such data is to
sentencing alternatives.27 Inquiry into prior convictions can serve several
purposes. In several cases, for example, the experience of a recidivist
with the guilty plea process, and with its consequences, was given
is not sufficient to establish incompetency as a matter of law); Manley v. United States. 396 F.2d
699 (5th Cir. 1968) (use of narcotics does not make a defendant per se incompetent); Deese v. United
States, 303 F. Supp. 619 (D. S.C. 1969) (allegation of narcotics use, including at arraignment, will
not necessarily overcome a record otherwise adequately showing voluntariness). But see Manley v.
United States, 396 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1968) (indicated that, were defendant under the influence of
narcotics at the arraignment, he might be found incompetent to plead); Widermyre v. State, 452
P.2d 885 (Alas. 1969) (post-conviction hearing granted because defendant's allegation of being on
LSD during the arraignment could not be tested in the record); State v. Waltman, .. Ariz. -,
467 P.2d 914 (1970) (defendant alleged he was "agreeable" to plead guilty because on
tranquilizers-the court found the evidence supporting the allegation inadequate); cf. Cooper v.
Holman, 356 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1967) (alleged that the plea was
coerced by police threats to deprive defendant of drugs-failure of proof); Pledger v. United States,
272 F.2d 69,70 (4th Cir. 1959) (incompetence at trial because of drug use required a hearing).
25. Manley v. United States, 396 F.2d 699 )5th Cir. 1968). Cf. Cooper v. Holman, 356 F.2d 82
(5th Cir. 1966); State v. Waltman, -Ariz..__, 467 P.2d 914 (1970).
26. See note 25 supra.
27. Eligibility of an accused for such sentencing statutes, in turn, may be important to a finding
of a voluntary guilty plea. See notes 86-93 infra and accompanying text. Cf. State v. Sisco, 169
N.W.2d 542,547 (Iowa 1969); State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553,554 (Mo. 1969).
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considerable weight in finding pleas voluntary and understanding .2 This
result, coupled with the mandates of Boykin and McCarthy that
voluntariness should appear on the record, strongly suggests the
necessity of the inquiry. In addition, it should be pointed out that
answers to this question can be compared with those prior convictions
included in a pre-sentence report. Any substantial variance between the
two would immediately put the judge on notice that the defendant was
not responding accurately during the arraignment and might, in some
instances, call for a refusal to accept the plea.
Survey responses only nominally tended toward necessity and many
categories of responses were distinctly negative [see Table 1 supra].
Questions about prior convictions were asked about half the time in state
courts and one quarter of the time in federal courts in the St. Louis area
[see Table 2 infra]. Although knowledge of prior convictions is
important,9 even without inquiry judges normally at least have such
information in front of them. The reason for the infrequency of inquiry is
apparently the inclusion of such data in pre-sentence reports, etc.3" The
fact that the judge has access to the information after the arraignment
should not be decisive, however, primarily because the defendant's own
response to the inquiry is the crucial factor in assessing competence.
28 See eg., Corn v. State of Oklahoma, 394 F.2d 478,479 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U S 917 (1968) (two prior felony convictions on pleas of guilty supported a finding that defendant
understood the consequences of his plea); People v. Bauta, - I11. App. 2d - 260 N.E.2d 306
11970), State v. Reid, 204 Kan. 418, - 463 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1970) (prior imprisonment in
reformatory supported finding that petitioner understood the consequences of his guilty plea);
Normandv. People, 165 Colo. 509, 512,440 P.2d 282, 283 (1968). For a case invalidating a guilty
plea when the interrogation record did not show inquiry as to prior convictions see State v. Fuentes,
__ Ariz. App.- 467 P.2d 760 (1970) (this inquiry is mandatory under ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 180).
( I State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1969) (prior record of defendant was not known when the
prosecutor offered a recommendation of probation in exchange for the plea and judge by "tenor"
and "tone" indicated assent to the bargain; when, because of the prior record, probation was not
forthcoming, defendant was allowed to withdraw the plea). The general relevance of prior
convictions to understanding is discussed in Note, Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in the Federal
Court , 55 COLUM L. REV. 366, 373-74 (1955).
Prior convictions for the same charge have been viewed by at least one court as bearing on the
determination of a factual basis for the guilty plea. Kress v. United States, 411 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.
1969) This practice seems questionable in view of evidence law sanctions against similar use. As the
plea itself does not determine factual basis, a rule similar to that applicable in a trial would seem
appropriate, at least to the degree that McCarthy requires this determination to be in the record and
in situations when other compelling evidence of "factual basis" is not available.
29 See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
30 Se generally R. DAWSON. SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH. AND
CONDITi ONS OF SENTENCE (1969). Cf, Note, Use of the Presentence Investigation in Missouri, 1964
WsH UL.O. 396,401 n.24.
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2. Voluntariness
As the fifth area of inquiry, the model questionnaire listed the
following question: "Are you voluntarily and understandingly entering
this plea?" Responses to the questionnaire were practically unanimous
in declaring that this question is absolutely necessary to a properly
conducted acceptance of a guilty plea by a trial court [see Table 1 supra].
In both state and federal St. Louis courts, however, the inquiry was
seldom made in this form [see Table 2 infra]. The absence of this pointed
inquiry in St. Louis courts apparently reflects a view that this question
would be superfluous if linked to various other more specific questions
relating to voluntariness, e.g., inquiry into threats or promises. The
survey responses and the St. Louis practice do illustrate that an inquiry
limited to this question alone would be woefully inadequate, although
pre-Boykin appellate decisions sustaining the voluntariness of a plea
reveal that frequently the trial judge asked no more. This sudden change
in philosophy may merely attest to the persuasive influence of the
Supreme Court's decisions on criminal matters. On the other hand, it
may independently reflect the discovery by some connected with the
guilty plea process that more extensive, sincere inquiries by trial court
judges will occasionally uncover a confused or poorly advised defendant.
In any event, it is difficult to determine whether this specific question
should be asked by the trial judge to the defendant. Under normal
circumstances, a well-rehearsed defendant will undoubtedly respond
affirmatively. The question can, nonetheless, serve to assure the very
young, the uneducated, the confused and those receiving their first taste
of the guilty plea grist-mill that the court is a neutral party serving as a
check on police and prosecutor action rather than as a rubber stamp for
it. Observations of arraignment procedures in St. Louis strongly suggest
that the ultimate value of this type of inquiry depends not on the content
or intent of the question, but instead on the method of delivery by the
questioner.
Substantive requirements that an accused understand the charge and
that the plea be voluntary antedate both Boykin and Rule 11, and are
generally viewed as crucial elements of due process. 3' Boykin, rather
31. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,223 (1927) ("... plea shall not be accepted unless
made voluntarily after proper advice and with full understanding of the consequences."); Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334 (1941) (the true nature of the charge is the "first and most uiversally
recognized requirement of due process. ... ). These two cases are considered to be the
Constitutional foundations for Rule 11.See Comment, 48 N.C. L. REv. 352,354 (1970).
Although the matter of a record is new through Boykin, the voluntariness requirement is widely
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than an exposition of new or latent rights, declares only the procedural
means by which those rights are to be protected-by requiring a showing
on the record of voluntariness.
Voluntariness and understanding contain three essential elements: the
assent to plead guilty by the defendant, 2 an understanding of the nature
of charges,3 and an understanding of the consequences of the plea.u
Although none of these elements are new notions, their content remains
suprisingly unsettled.
a. Threats, Coercion and Duress
Threats, coercion and duress which induce a plea of guilty, as a
general proposition, invalidate that plea. There are, however, outer
recognized. E.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962); Kercheval v. United States,
274 U S. 220, 223 (1927); Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969); Silverberg v. Warden,
Maryland Penitentiary, 7 Md. App. 657, 658-59, 256 A.2d 821, 822 (1969); People v. Taylor, 9
Mich. App. 333, 155 N.W.2d 723 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715
(1970); Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 601, 605, 414 P.2d 601, 604 (1966); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11;
A I-AS R CRIM. P. 1 (voluntary with understanding of the nature ofthe charge); COLO. R. CRIM. P.
1I; FLA R. CRIM. P. 1.1750; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; 2 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 556 (1967); ME. R.
CRIM. P. I1; Mo. R. CRIM. P. 25.04; MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (cum. supp. 1969);
NEv REv. STAT. § 174.035 (1969); PA. R. CRIM. P. 319(a); S.D. COMp. L. § 23-35-19 (1967)
(defendant must be apprised of his rights and be found acting of his own "free will and accord");
Ttx CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (1966) (defendant must be admonished of consequences, appear
"plainly sane" and "uninfluenced by fear, persuasion or delusive hope of pardon"); Wyo. R. CRIM.
P IS. Cf. Hansen v. Mathews, 424 F.2d 1205, 1208 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, - U.S. _,90
S Ct 1404 (1970); United States States ex rel. Fear v. Pennsylvania, 423 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States ei rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790,793 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 924
(1969); Brown v. Beto. 377 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1967); Hinton v. Henry, 311 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. N.C.
1%9); Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488,492 (E.D. Wis. 1969); United States ex rel. Heath v.
Rundle, 298 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 805-06 (D. Utah
1%8); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813,451 P.2d 1014 (1969); People v. Thomas, 41 1I1.2d 122,126,
242 N.E 2d 177, 179 (1968); People v. Wright, 32 App. Div.2d 847,300 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1969). For a
general discussion of this see D. NEWMAN. CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUTTRIAL 22-31 (1966).
32 D. NEWMAN. CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL
22-31 (1966). See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
33 See note 112 infra and accompanying text. See also Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334
(1941).
34 See notes 79-103 infra and accompanying text. See also Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S.
220, 223 (1927).
35 Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). Machibroda is the leading statement of
this proposition and is, in its general sense at least, universally followed, see, e.g., United States ex
rel Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216, 1218
(9th Cir. 1969); Townes v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 924 (1969);
Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155, 159 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968); Luse v.
United States, 326 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1964); Aiken v. United States, 296 F.2d 604, 607 (4th Cir.
% 11); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803,806 (D. Utah 1968); Gibson v. Boles, 288 F. Supp. 472,
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limits to the general proposition. Threats to prosecute others are not
considered sufficiently coercive to invalidate the guilty plea of one not
474 (N.D. W. Va. 1968); United States ex rel. Perpiglia, 221 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D. Pa. 1963); State v.
Linsner, -_Ariz. _ 467 P.2d 238,241 (1970); Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503,505 (Del. 1969);
People v. Thomas, 41 111. 2d 122, 126,242 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1968); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,
548 (Iowa 1969); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333,338, 155 N.W.2d 723,726 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970); Woods v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2d 601,605,414
P.2d 601, 604 (1966); State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96
(1964).
Beyond the theoretical level, there are several matters at issue as to threats and coercion. First,
must there be actual coercion? Compare Townes v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1968) (which
indicates that any subjective perception of threat may invalidate the plea as long as there is some
supporting objective evidence) with People v. Thomas, 41 111. 2d 122, 126, 242 N.E.2d 177, 179
(1968) (which discusses physical and psychological coercion, presumably questions of fact, as the
limit of constitutional interest in the area of voluntariness). The latter position, though an extreme
statement, probably better represents the law at this moment. The threats or coercion inquiry seems
to fit within the category of things measured by "objective" criteria (see notes 44-5I infra). This
conclusion seems even more logical in view of the likelihood that it is official conduct which is to be
deterred (see notes 45-5I infra and accompanying text). To the degree that Townes v. Peyton may be
read as emphasizing the subjective perception of a defendant (as opposed to the probability of
official misconduct which combining subjective perception and "some" objective facts would
provide), its result is inconsistent with the general case law in this area. Further support for the view
that the "threats" inquiry is designed to curtail official misconduct may be found in cases which,
although threats arc obviously present, do not sanction the threat or find the plea involuntary:
threats of prosecution of others (see note 41 infra); threats to prosecute defendant on other charges
(see note 38 infra); and more generally coercion and pressure from theoretical "allies" of the
defendant such as family (see note 39 infra) or counsel [see, e.g., United States ex rel. Brown v.
LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970); Decker v. Sigler, 310 F. Supp. 588 (D. Neb. 1969)], from
situations (see note 37 infra) or from mere fear of a more severe sentence (see note 40 infra). That a
person normally bears a heavy proof burden in overcoming his denial of threats at the arraignment
[see, e.g., Raymond v. State, 251 A.2d 509 (Me. 1969)] but that, when "official" threats are
involved, a hearing is normally required [see, e.g., Brumley . State, 224 So. 2d 447 (Fla. App. 1969)]
further ratefies the "objective" characterization ofjudicial interest in "threats".
The conspicuous problem area as regards "threats, coercion, duress" is illegal evidence and its
impact on the voluntariness of the plea. Usually illegal evidence, combined with fear of its use,
which induces the guilty plea renders the plea invalid as not voluntary.See, e.g., United States ev ret.
Vaughn v. LaVallee, 318 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963), overruled as to defendants with counsel, United
States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018 (2d Cir. 1965); Turner v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 207,
208 (W.D. Va. 1970); United States e rel. Wakeley V. Russell, 309 F. Supp. 68,72 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F. Supp. 698 (D. S.C. 1969); United States ex rel. Heath v. Rundle, 298 F.
Supp. 1207,1211 (E.D. Pa. 1969); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542 (Iowa 1969); People v. Taylor, 9
Mich. App. 333,338, 155 N.W.2d 723,726 (1968); State ex rel. Parks v. Tahash, - Minn..-
170 N.W.2d 448 (1969); Commonwealth v. Hollaway, 215 Pa. Super. 136, _ 257 A.2d 308, 309
(1969); State v. Biastock, 42 Wis. 2d 525, 532, 167 N.W.2d 231, 235 (1969). The limiter is the
demonstration of a causal relationship between the improper evidence or illegal procedure and the
plea; i.e., a mere demonstration of the defect will not suffice, the defect must induce the plea. For
cases recognizing the principle but finding the causal relationship inadequately demonstrated see,
e.g.. Turner v. Cox, 312 F. Supp. 207,208 (W.D. Va. 1970) (here the petitioner failed to allege the
relationship); Quillien v. Leeke, 303 F. Supp. 698,706 (D.S.C. 1969); United States ex rel. Heath v.
Rundle, 298 F. Supp. 1207, 1211 (E.D. Pa. 1969). In United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Russell, the
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directly the object of such threat;3 6 an aura of coercion-e.g., a
community climate of racial hatred-has been held not to affect
vountariness; 37 knowledge that other charges may be brought or
prosecuted will not invalidate a guilty plea to a given charge;3 family
pressure to plead guilty will not invalidate the plea as coerced;39 and a
defendant's fear of more severe sentences if he stands trial cannot
invalidate an otherwise voluntary plea." Several of these exceptions are,
district court indicated four questions to be utilized in evaluating a claim of involuntary plea
grounded on unconstitutional evidence:
(I) did the plea of guilty waive the right to challenge the evidence? The measure is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. This clearly supports inquiry at trial into the
possibility of such evidence being behind the plea and, when found, supplying a defendant
with indications of the possibility of suppressing it. See also People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App.
333, 338, 155 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1968) (one of five areas of inquiry seen as mandatory is
whether there was a confession or admission and what its relation is to the plea); Note,
Withdrawal oj Guilty Pleas in the Federal Courts, 55 COLUM. L. REv. 366, 370-71 (1955)
(advocating such a determination on the record).
(2) was the confession coerced? This, of course, may be expressed in terms of whether the
procedure was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Holloway, 215 Pa. Super. 136,
257 A.2d 308 (1969) (illegal line-up).
(3) if coerced, did it induce or taint the guilty plea?
(4) if it did not induce the plea, was the plea otherwise voluntary?
United States ex rel Wakeley v. Russell, 309 F. Supp. 68,72 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
The continuing validity of the above lines of cases as to counselled defendants is, however,
extremely questionable. See McMann v. Richardson, - U.S. _ 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970); Brady
v United States, U.S. 90 S.Ct. 1463 (1970); Parkerv. North Carolina, - U.S.
90 S Ct. 1458 (1970); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713 (1969); LaFave, The
Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. CoMp. L. 532,547 (1970).
36 E g., Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795,798 (1st Cir. 1959) (threat to prosecute defendant's
fiancee and hold family members as material witnesses did not render the plea involuntary); cf.
Drake v. State, 45 Wis. 2d 226, 233, 172 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1969) (defendant knew his wife was
suspected of the crime he plead guilty to-the court refused to sanction the underworld code of
"Omerta. or Death to the Informer" indicating that if coercive, it was self-imposed coercion
"which does not weaken the voluntary and knowledgeable aspect of an act based on it"). But see
Crow v. United States, 397 F.2d 284 (10th Cir. 1968) (indicating that, as the petitioner alleged his
plea was prompted by the threat to prosecute third persons, a voluntariness hearing was required).
37 Townes v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1968) (racial bias in community caused defendant
to lear trial). Other coercive situation cases indicate that it is "official" involvement in the coercive
situation which will determine that a coercive situation hasmade the plea involuntary, but compare
Bland v. State, 451 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969) (petitioner alleged that confessions of co-
defendants coerced his plea-finding the plea voluntary and indicating that all guilty pleas are the
result of some coercion or influence but that only some types of coercion render pleas involuntary)
with C ommonwealth v. Velasquez, 437 Pa. 262, 263 A.2d 351 (1970) (counsel pressed defendant to
plead guilty and the court would not give defendant a continuance to retain other counsel-his plea
was held involuntary).
38 E.g., State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347 (Iowa 1970).
39 Eg., United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970) (a guilty plea
alleged to be the response to defendant's mother's pressure was not involuntary).
40 E g., White v. Gnann, 422 F.2d 1306 (5th Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Amuso v.
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nonetheless, fraught with coercive elements and, as such, in
contravention of the policy stated above. For example, the allegation of
a threat to prosecute the accused's fiancee as an accessory in Kent v.
United States seems undeniably capable of inducing a plea.4' On appeal,
the First Circuit stated:
We are not prepared to say that it can be coercion to inform a defendant
that someone close to him who is guilty of a crime will be brought to book
if he does not plead. If a defendant elects to sacrifice himself for such
motives, that is his choice, and he cannot reverse it after he is dissatisfied
with his sentence, or with other subsequent developments."2
Although in some respects a shocking result-particularly in view of
the Machibroda doctrine that any threats or promises which remove
voluntariness invalidate the plea 3-it is not difficult to reconcile these
seemingly clashing doctrines. Machibroda directs attention to the
improper removal of choice from the defendant. Thus, the Kent court's
discussion in terms of "choice" to sacrifice moves toward a
reconciliation of the doctrines.
A better explanation lies in the "objective" and "subjective" tests of
voluntariness outlined in United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi.11
The "objective test" is designed, Thurmond indicates, to deter official
misconduct. 5 Although, therefore, the ultimate issue is the defendant's
state of mind-i.e., voluntariness-that issue will only be met if a threat
or element of coercion is indicated and is indicated to flow from some
sort of official misconduct. Threats or promises calculated to overwhelm
a defendant's ability to choose his trial course rationally render a plea of
guilty involuntary as a matter of law.4 6 The "objective test" thus
parallels the kind of policy choices represented in the Miranda47 and
Escobedols decisions, the "silver platter" decisions," and others."0
Threats, coercion and duress are generally viewed only in terms of the
LaVallee, 291 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); cf. United States v. Wiley, 267 F.2d 453 (7th Cir.
1959), remanded with directions, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960),followed, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1960).
41. Kent v. United States, 272 F.2d 795 (lst Cir. 1959).
42. Id. at 798.
43. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,493 (1962).
44. 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
45. Id. at 515-16.
46. Id. at 516. See also Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487,493 (1962).
47. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
48. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
49. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
50. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (searches and seizures).
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"objective test": whether the plea is voluntary is thus, in this area,
apparently of secondary importance; paramount importance and
attention being drawn to the role of law enforcement officials. This is
reflected in various decisions which discuss the alleged coercion in terms
of the legitimacy of the prosecutor's actions rather than the coercive
aspect of his actions.-
I t is clear from the case law that inquiry must be made at arraignment
regarding threats, coercion and duress. The function of the inquiry is to
determine the legitimacy of official conduct, and only incidentally the
state of mind of the pleading defendant. Whether inputs of coercion,
whatever their lawfulness, ought to be permitted in this phase of the
criminal justice process is inadequately explored by courts to this
point-at least from the view of the accused's freewill. St. Louis federal
courts in all cases and state courts in thirty percent of the arraignments
viewed asked whether there were threats leading to the plea [see Table 2
infra]. In none of the arraignments was there inquiry as to threats of
prosecution of others [see Table 2 infra]. Survey responses did not
completely reflect the dichotomy seen in the case law and the St. Louis
arraignments. Threats, coercion, and duress were seen as absolutely
necessary inquiry by all categories of survey respondents (question 6);
threats of prosecution of others (question 7), on the other hand, were
seen as absolutely necessary by only responding U.S. Attorneys, and
state trial and appellatejudges [see Table 1 supra].
b. Promises of Sentence Concessions
Promises of sentence concessions (survey question 8) represents
inquiry which probably may not be avoided. Under Machibroda v.
United States, any threats or promises which induce a plea of guilty
invalidate that plea. 52
5 I. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F.2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970) (even though the prosecutor was
not aware of the forbidden character of the action with which he threatened defendant, the
impropriety of the threat rendered the plea invalid); Ford v. United States, 418 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.
1969) (threat to prosecute under habitual offender provisions, which would lead to longer sentence,
did not invalidate the plea as coerced); O'Neill v. United States, 315 F. Supp. 1352 (D. Minn. 1970)
(plea of guilty to federal crime prompted by threat to prosecute for a more serious state offense was
not involuntary); State v. Abodeely, 179 N.W.2d 347,353 (Iowa 1970) (the county attorney's threat
to file notice of additional incriminating evidence was not prohibited coercion).
52 368 U.S. 487,493 (1962) ("... a guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive
it of the character of a voluntary act, is void."). See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216,
1218 (9th Cir. 1969); Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1968); Aiken v. United States,
296 F2d 604, 607 (4th Cir. 1961); Gibson v. Boles, 288 F. Supp. 472,474 (N.D. W.Va. 1968);
Hinton v. Henry, 311 F. Supp. 652, 654 (E.D. N.C. 1969); McClure v. Boles, 233 F. Supp. 928
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In relating promises to voluntariness, the "objective" test may again
be employed.0 Under the objective test, and if a promise induces the
plea, it must be kept." If a promise is not kept, the plea is as a matter of
law involuntary.5 5 Again, the reason for the inquiry and the rule is to
deter certain types of official misconduct" and does not directly relate to
the defendant's state of mind or free will. Obviously, if the defendant's
state of mind was in question, the fulfillment of the promise would be
irrelevant. The standard here is instead often characterized in terms of
"fairness" 7-- it is deemed "unfair" to induce a plea with a promise
which is not kept, obtaining waiver of important constitutional rights by
what is in essence a fraud. It is reversible error to do so.s
(N.D. W.Va. 1964); Hulett v. Sigler, 242 F. Supp. 705 (D. Neb. 1965); State v. Carpenter,
Ariz. - 467 P.2d 749,751 (1970); Brown v. State, 250 A .2d 503,505 (Del. 1969); State v. Sisco,
169 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Iowa 1969) (adopts A.B.A. Minimum Standards Relating to Guilty Pleas);
People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 155 N.W.2d 723 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 383 Mich.
338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970); State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Mo. 1969); State ey rel.
Burnette v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (1964); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d
661, 674, 170 N.W.2d 713, 719 (1969); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (1966) ("uninfluenced
... by any persuasion or delusive hope of pardon....); A.B.A. § 1.5.
53. See notes 44-51 supra.
54. See, e.g., Hansen v. Mathews, 424 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 1404 (1970);
People v. Smith, 34 App. Div. 2d 621,309 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1970); State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553
(Mo. 1969); People v. Delles, 69 Cal. 2d 906,447 P.2d 629,73 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1968); In re Valle,
364 Mich. 471, 110 N.W.2d 673 (1961); cf. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962);
United States v. Finney, 242 F. Supp. 112 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (a kept promise not to foreclose on
defendant's father's house as a result of defendant's forfeiture of bond).
55. See, e.g., Hansen v. Mathews, 424 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. - 90 S.
Ct. 1404 (1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1969); State v. Wolske,
280 Minn. 465, 160 N.W.2d 146 (1968) (unkept promise to dismiss other charges); State v. Krois,
74 Wash. 2d 404,445 P.2d 24 (1968) (unkept promise of medical treatment); People v. Cassiday, 90
Ill. App. 2d 132, 232 N.E.2d 795 (1967) (promised probation and fine; received prison term); cf,
Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962) (if prosecutor knows sentence
recommendations will not be requested by judge, and yet induces a guilty plea by a promise to
recommend leniency if requested, his promise is wholly illusory, violates due process, and requires
automatic reversal). Several courts have suggested-or held-that any bargain renders the plea
involuntary regardless of its performance. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, rev'd on
rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev'd on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)
(per curiam); People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, _ 162 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1968) (Levin, J.,
concurring); Application of Buccheri, 6 Ariz. App. 196, 431 P.2d 91, (1967). The remedy for an
unkept promise has not always been reversal and vacation of the plea of guilty. If the failure to
perform the promise is viewed as "unfair" rather than as a factor rendering the plea involuntary,
the remedy is fulfillment of the promise rather than reversal. See People v. Smith, 34 App. Div.2d
621,309 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1970).
56. See note 59 infra. Cf. United States ec rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. N.Y.
1966).
57. See, e.g., State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1969); People v. Smith, 34 App. Div. 621,
309 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1970).
58. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 54-55 supra; United States v. Graham, 325 F.2d 922 (6th Cir.
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A "subjective" test may also be occasionally employed in gauging the
relationship between promise and plea to find voluntariness.59 Here the
test requires a consideration of the probable effect of a promise on the
ability of an accused to choose how he shall plead. Unlike the objective
test, which aims at the propriety of official conduct, promises by almost
anyone, under the subjective state of mind test, may, if acted upon,
render the plea involuntary. Thus, for example, a promise by a
defendant's counsel of a given case disposition-when that disposition is
not forthcoming-may render the plea involuntary." There are checks
on this process: first, a mere intuition about a probable disposition will
not render the plea involuntary-the promise must be of a specific
sentence;" second, reliance on the existence of the promise must be
1963); United States v. Schneer, 105 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Pa. 195 1); State v. Hovis, 353 Mo. 602, 183
S W_2d 147 (1944).
59 See, eg., Townes v. Peyton, 404 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1968) (requires some objective evidence to
support the belief); United States v. Lester, 247 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1957); United States e rel.
Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. N.Y. 1967); TEXAS CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13
(1966); see generally Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L, REV. 865 (1964). But see LeFebre v. State, 40 Wis. 2d 666, 162 N.W.2d 544
(1968) (holding that no "subjective test" may be applied, defendant's belief, absent an actual
bargain does not render a plea involuntary).
60 See Gilmore v. People, 364 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Wilkins v.
Banmiller, 325 F.2d 514 (3rd Cir. 1963); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803, 808 (D. Utah 1968);
United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. N.Y. 1966); State v. Rose, 440
S W 2d 441,443 (Mo. 1969); Davidson v. State, 92 Idaho 104,437 P.2d 620 (1968) (McFadden, J.,
dissenting). Contra People 4 rel. LaFay v. McMann, 33 App. Div.2d 1102, 308 N.Y.S.2d 253
(1970) But cf. People v. Walls, 3 Mich. App. 279, 142 N.W.2d 38 (1966). See generally Enker,
Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in TASK FORCE: COURTS 108.
i f the lawyer merely tells his client that he expects a lighter sentence if the defendant pleads guilty,
but does not imply that his expectation is on the basis of any "agreement" or "deal", the plea will
generally not be considered involuntary merely because the defendant's expectations are inaccurate.
See, e g., Wellnitz v. Page, 420 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Berry, 309 F.2d 311 (7th
Cir 1962); Dewey v. United States, 268 F.2d 124 (8th Cir. 1959); Floyd v. United States, 260 F.2d
910 (5th Cir. 1958); Meredith v. United States, 208 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Johnson, 269 F. Supp. 767 (S.D. N.Y. 1967); State v. Andrews, 79 N.J. Super. 17, 190 A.2d 201
(1963); Jacobs v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 232 Md. 627, 192 A.2d 786 (1963);
Commonwealth v. Guthier, 435 Pa. 353, _ 257 A.2d 586, 587 (1969). But see Wilson v. Rose,
366 F 2d 611 (9th Cir. 1966).
There is no general requirement that the promises be made by a state official, such as the
prosecutor. See Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979,980 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Thus, questioning
at arraignment should not be limited to "promises by the prosecutor", but should include an
inquiry re promises by "anyone". See, e.g., ABA § 1.5; Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del.
1969)
61 See. e g., Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803,808 (D. Utah 1968); United States v. Johnson,
269 F Supp. 767,769 (S.D. N.Y. 1967). But cf. People ex rel. LaFay v. McMann, 33 App. Div. 2d
1102, 308 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1970).
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convincingly proven to an appeal court-this has sometimes been
adequately demonstrated by immediate protest of the sentence."
Inquiry as to promises (question 8) of sentence concessions was seen
by all save two categories in the survey as absolutely necessary inquiry
[see Table 1 supra]. In a majority of arraignments viewed in St.
Louis-including all federal arraignments-the accused was asked
whether the plea was the result of any promises [see Table 2 infra]. Both
questionnaire responses and the St. Louis practice conform with the
common law requirement of a promises inquiry.
c. Plea Bargains
Plea bargains present a very special problem. Some scholars have
argued that any plea bargain is per se unconstitutional."3 Recent
Supreme Court decisions, albeit in what might be characterized as dicta,
seem to legitimize bargains, at least when the bargaining defendant has
the benefit of counsel." For some reason, perhaps because of the
ambiguous constitutionality of plea bargaining, the process has
remained hidden in most arraignments. 5 This sub rosa approach has
62. Cf. United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F. Supp. 508 (E.D. N.Y. 1967)
(defendant wrotejudge immediately after sentencing).
63. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, rev'd on rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.
1957) (en banc), rev'd on confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curtam); People v. Byrd, 12
Mich. App. 186,_ 162 N.W.2d 777,782 (Mich. App. 1968) (Levin, J., concurring); Application
of Buccheri, 6 Ariz. App. 196,431 P.2d 91 (1967); cf. Heideman v. United States, 281 F.2d 805 (8th
Cir. 1960); Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D.C. Neb. 1964); People v. Hoerle, 3 Mich. App. 693,
143 N.W.2d 593 (1966). See generally Comment, Voluntariness of Plea of Guilty Made in Response
to Promise ofLeniency, 35 N.Y. U.L. REv. 284 (1969).
64. See Brady v. United States, - U.S. - 90 S.Ct. 146 (1970); McMann v. Richardson,
U.S. - 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970); cf. Parker v. North Carolina - U.S..------, 90 S.Ct. 1458
(1970). Justice White states in Brady:
We decline to hold, however, that a guilty plea is compelled and invalid under the Fifth
Amendment whenever motivated by the defendant's desire to accept the certainty or
probability of a lesser pelanty rather than face a wider range of possibilities extending from
acquital to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by law for the crime charged.
We cannot hold that it is unconstitutional for the state to extend a benefit to a defendant who
in turn extends a substantial benefit to the state and who demonstrates by his plea that he is
ready and willing to admit his crime and to enter the correctional system in a frame of mind
which affords hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than might
otherwise be necessary.
Brady v. United States, .__-U.S. -, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1470, 1471 (1970).
65. The system usually operates in an informal, invisible manner. There is ordinarily no
formal recognition that the defendant has been offered an inducement to plead guilty.
Although the participants and frequently the judge know that negotiation has taken place,
the prosecutor and defendant must ordinarily go through a courtroom ritual in which they
deny that the guilty plea is the result of any threat or promise.
TASK FORCE: COURTS 9. At least one defendant, attempting to demonstrate that his plea of guilty
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/3
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occurred in spite of the prevelance of the practice. As one state-trial
judge indicated in his survey response: "As a practical matter I know of
no pleas in my court where they are not the result of plea bargaining. I
no longer even pretend that the plea is not the result of at least an
understanding that a certain recommendation is going to be made. '",
Many courts have in fact recognized both the existence and legitimacy of
plea bargains' 7 although only a few have required their exposure on the
record. Inquiry about the existence of a bargain operates similarly to the
'"promises" inquiry. As such, it is designed to expose both objective and
subjective difficulties with a plea's voluntariness. Promises and plea
bargains are intimately connected, and the difficulties with each are
parallel. By remaining sub rosa inducements to guilty pleas, neither
objective criteria (is the bargain "fair"? 8, is it fulfilled?, 9 is election to
take the prosecutor's offer a free will decision or coerced?°70 etc.) nor
subjective criteria (is there a bargain at all?, 71 what effect does the
bargain have on defendant's decision?7 ) are brought to the attention of
was involuntary, argued that his negative response to the trial judges question concerning promises,
when in fact there was a bargain, evidenced his confusion over what was occurring at his
arraignment. See Holmes v. State, 283 Minn. 520, 166 N.W.2d 715 (1969).
66 Letter from a public defender to Washington University Law Quarterly.
67 See McMann v. Richardson, - US. _., 90 S.Ct. 1441(1970); Jones v. United States,
423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Thomas, 415 F.2d 1216 (9th Cir. 1969); Gilmore v.
California, 364 F2d 916,918 (9th Cir. 1966); Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699,701 (9th Cir.
1964); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803,806 (D. Utah 1968); State v. Carpenter, -Ariz.
467 P.2d 749 (1970); Commonwealth ex rel. Kerekes v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 337,223 A.2d 699 (1966).
One reason for the general approval and widespread use of plea bargaining is the criminal justice
system's reliance on a large percentage of guilty pleas. As such, offers of concessions to induce
guilty pleas are a necessity. See TASK FORCE: COURTS 9; D. Newman, CONVICTION: THE
DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 78 (1966); Note, Guilty Plea
Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
But see People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, _ 162 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1968) (Levin, J.,
concurring). The bargaining system, especially when conducted sub silentio, has been criticized as
an unsatisfactory mechanism for processing accused. See Newman, Pleading Guilty for
Consideraton: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J. CRIM. L.C. & P. S. 780,790 (1956); Dash, Cracks
in the Foundation of Criminal Justice, 46 ILL. L. REV. 385 (1951).
68 See generally D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL 32-44 (1966).
69 CI. People v. Montogomery, 27 N.Y.2d 601, 261 N.E.2d 409 (1970).
70- See Lassiter v. Turner, 423 F2d 897 (4th Cir. 1970); Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252
(9th Cir. 1970).
71. Cf. Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1962); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439
Pa- 21, 264 A.2d 643 (1970). "Even where there have been no explicit negotiations, defendants
relying on prevailing practices often act on the justifiable assumption that those who plead guilty
will be sentenced more leniently." TASK FORCE: COURTS 9.
72 Cf. United States ec rel. Brown v. LaValle, 424 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1970).
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the judge. The response of the American Bar Association in its
Minimum Standards Relating to Guilty Pleas was advocacy of an open,
on the record judicial review and approval of plea bargain terms.73
Active judicial participation in the bargaining process, even if limited to
post-bargaining review as suggested by the ABA Minimum Standards,
will undoubtedly shift a portion of the prosecutor's burden of public
accountability to the trial judge. The recent adoption or approval of the
,ABA position by several courts74 is strong authority for the argument
that the advantages of a judicial safeguard on an otherwise hidden
practice outweigh any negative aspects of pressing trial courts with
increased responsibility. 75 If arraignment procedure for guilty pleas
continues without a reform of this type, judges will be required to
entertain the legal fiction that an on the record showing of voluntariness
under Boykin need not include any consideration or even mention of the
principal motivating cause for a large percentage of guilty pleas entered
in this country. It must be conceded, however, that current arraignment
procedures are built around just this fiction.
Our rules require the defendant, upon entry of his plea, to indicate that
there have been no promises made to him. As a practical matter, such
promises are made, but not necessarily with regard to sentence, but
particularly with regard to eliminating counts of [an] indictment where
sentencing would no doubt be concurrent. Examination of the New Jersey
73. ABA §§ 1.5, 1.8,3.1. SeeTASK FORCe: COURTS 12-13 ("Experience with a plea bargaining
system in which negotiations are open, visible and subject to judicial scrutiny should help to identify
the risks involved in the system . . ."). For a sharp criticism of the ABA approach, see People v.
Earegood, 12 Mich. App. 256, 162 N.W.2d 802 (1968).
74. See Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,547
(Iowa 1969); State v. Tyler, 440 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1969); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333,338,
155 N.W.2d 723,727 (1968), rev'd on othergrounds, 383 Mich. 338,175 N.W.2d 715 (Mich. 1970);
cf. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 342-a (McKinney supp. 1970); Weintraub & Tough, Lesser Pleas
Considered, 32 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 506 (1942).
75. The open bargain, however, has been criticized as demeaning of courts. As one judge stated:
...both the judicial and public consciences may well be outraged where defendant's
conduct, truthfully related on the record, constitutes a serious offense and, also related on the
record, that defendant is allowed to enter a guilty plea to a less serious offense.
. ..much of the public would object to some agreements which in the past have been
allowed. And so once again, at least as to those judges and the more "delicate" cases, the
parties will have to resort to pre-plea secret negotiations and prearranged answers bearing no
necessary relationship to what has in truth occurred. Nothing could be more calculated to
destroy the integrity of the judicial process and to denigrate respect for law and order among
those brought to he bar ofjustice...
People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186,213-14, 162 N.W.2d 777,791-92 (1968) (Levin, J. concurring).
[Vol. 1970:289
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Rules will indicate that no mention of this can be made at the time of plea.
Some means of bringing this onto the record should be provided. 7'
This practice, as described in New Jersey and prevalent in most states,
requires the judge, the defendant, and the attorneys in the courtroom to
play a dishonest game. Without empirical data, it is impossible to assess
the number of defendants who, as a consequence, view the entire
arraignment in like fashion.7
Survey responses were, in general, highly favorable toward this area of
inquiry [see Table 1 supra]. In St. Louis courts a specific question about
the existence of a plea bargain or negotiated plea was never asked in the
arraignments viewed [see Table 2 infra]. In addition, none of the
defendants pleading in those arraignments responded affirmatively when
asked if any promises had been made. One federal arraignment
witnessed revealed an informal method of judicial involvement in the
bargaining process. In that case, a young woman appeared before the
judge with appointed counsel and tendered a plea of guilty to all of the
six original counts brought against her. The judge was visibly troubled
by the plea, and proceeded to question the defendant at some length.
Through his questioning, he discovered that the defendant's counsel had
been appointed that same morning when the woman's original appointed
counsel failed to appear. Although the word "bargain" was never
mentioned, the judge refused to accept the pleas and made it clear that he
thought a "conference" between the newly appointed counsel and the
United States Attorney was in order. Following the conference which
then took place in the corner of the courtroom, the United States
Attorney moved to dismiss four of the original six counts. The motion
was granted immediately and the defendant's plea to the remaining two
counts accepted, following her recitation that no promises had been
made to her concerning the plea.78 It should be noted that the judge was
noticably angered at the failure of both attorneys to work the matter out
prior to their appearance before him.
76 Letter from a state trial judge to the Washington University Law Quarterly.
77 The defendant is expected to "follow the rubric of telling the court no promise has induced
the plea, and while this game is played the prosecutor and defense counsel mutely corroborate the
defendant's false statement." United States v. Jackson, 390 F.2d 130, 138 (7th Cir. 1968) (Kiley, J.,
dissenting); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the UnitedStates, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 542
(1970) CJ.J. RUBIN, Do IT! 158 (1970).
78 Student transcribed arraignment on file at Washington University Law Quarterly.
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d. Consequences of the Plea
An appreciation by the defendant of the consequences of pleading
guilty is an essential element of a "voluntary and understanding" plea.79
This universally includes knowledge of the maximum sentencing
possibility." When, by statute, there is a minimum sentence, this
minimum is likewise a "consequence" of which the accused must be
aware."1 It is error to inform defendant of a given maximum and then
sentence him following a subsequent guilty plea to a longer term of
imprisonment.Y Boykin's on the record requirement is best facilitated in
this area of inquiry by simply addressing the defendant and appraising
him accurately of the possible sentencing ranges following conviction.
Most survey responses recognized the necessity of this inquiry [see
Table 1 supra]. In St. Louis courts the accused was informed of potential
79. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927). See generally D. NEWMAN.
CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 32-33 (1966).
80. E.g., Grant v. United States, 424 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1970); Chavez v. Wilson, 417 F.2d 584
(9th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790 (3d Cir. 1968); Trujillo v.
United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1967); Meaton v. United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964),
cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965); Aikin v. United States, 296 F.2d 604,607 (4th Cir. 1961); Hinton
v. Henry, 311 F. Supp. 652, 653 (E.D. N.C. 1969); Matthews v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 456,
457 (S.D. N.Y. 1969); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803,807 (D. Utah 1968); Ware v. State,
Ala. App. _ 219 So. 2d 910, 912 (1969); Ingram v. State, 450 P.2d 161 (Alas. 1969); State v.
Carpenter, Ariz....... ,467 P.2d 749, 751 (1970); Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503, 505 (Del.
1969); People v. Thomas, 41 111. 2d 122, 242 N.E.2d 177 (1968); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,
547 (Iowa 1969); Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484,248 A.2d 401 (1968); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich.
App. 333,338-39, 155 N.W.2d 723,726 (1968), rev'd on other grounds, 383 Mich. 338,175 N.W.2d
715 (1970); Copenhaver v. State, 431 P.2d 669, 674 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1967); Nealy v. Cupp,
467 P.2d 649 (Ore. Ct. App. 1970); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21,264 Ai.d 643 (1970);
State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486, 494, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (1964); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (cum. supp. 1969); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 26.13 (1966); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 62-3-la (1966). Most of the above cases do not focus exclusively on the maximum
sentence but implicitly include mandatory minimum sentences with such language as "the range of
punishment". Sometimes the inclusion is explicit, as where the requirement is said to be that the
court determine if defendant understands the "maximum and minimum sentencing possibilities".
The statement must be definite. See People v. Terry, 44 Il. 2d 38, 253 N.E.2d 383 (1969) (the plea
was held invalid because the trial court, informing of an "indeterminate" sentence of "not less than
one year", did not fully apprise defendant of the consequences of his plea); People v. Medley, 122
Ill. App. 2d 290,258 N.E.2d 392 (1970).
81. E.g., State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1969). See also ABA § IA (c)(ii).
Statement of the minimum without statement of the maximum penalty will not adequately inform
the accused of the consequence of his plea; thus, the "minimum sentence" statement only adds to,
when there is a statutory minimum, the broader requirement noted in footnote 80 supra. See People
v. Terry, 44 Ill. 2d 38,253 N.E.2d 383 (1969). The A BA Project also indicates that statement of the
minimum may not always be required. ABA 28.
82.- E.g., Nealy v. Cupp, 467 P.2d 649 (Ore. Ct. App. 1970); cf. Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp.
488,492-93 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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sentence ranges in 53% of state and 75% of federal arraignments viewed
[see Table 2 infra]. Since most defendants in the arraignments viewed
had counsel, it is possible that in many arraignments the defense counsel
is still assumed to have apprised defendant of the consequences. s3 Such
an assumption in the federal courts, while perhaps accurate, is
nonetheless in violation of Rule 11.
e. Concurrent and Consecutive Sentencing Possibilities
Concurrent and consecutive sentencing possibilities are similarly
necessary; that is, the defendant must understand their implications for
his sentence."' The information is, however, implicit in an accurate
maximum/minimum sentence range apprisal. Thus, in a normal case,
the maximum sentence statement should incorporate cumulative
sentence possibilities. It should be noted that a misstatement or non-
statement of potential sentencing ranges invalidates a plea only if the
error misleads the defendant to his detriment."' For example, a defendant
sentenced to 15 years on a guilty plea after a judge's statement that the
charge had a maximum 15 year penalty has little to complain about,
even though the statute may indicate an actual 30 year maximum.
Few categories of survey respondents felt this to be an "absolutely
necessary" area of inquiry (state appellate judges, U. S. Attorneys,
Legal Aid Lawyers and public defenders, however did) [see Table 1
supra]. This information was not presented to defendants in any
arraignments viewed in St. Louis [see Table 2 infra]. This absence
reflects that concurrent/consecutive sentences may be; as noted above,
inferentially stated in terms of the maximum/minimum sentence range
faced by an accused. The problem in the St. Louis courts, however, was
a frequent failure to inform the defendant of any sentencing range.
83. Such continued reliance on the assumption is however, improper under the rules of either
court, since Missouri's rule for the acceptance of guilty pleas substantially reproduces the
requirements of federal Rule 11. Certainly both rules require that the judge himself make the
"'voluntary and understanding" determination to which consequences are key. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1;
Mo. R CRiM. P. 25.04.
84 E.g, Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488,492 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See also State v. Sisco,
169 N .W2d 542,547 (Iowa 1969); ABA § 1.4 (c)(i).
85. Eg., Luckman v. Burke, 299 F. Supp. 488,492 (E.D. Wis. 1969). Since the principal impact
of consecutive or concurrent sentence will usually be on the parole timetable, the rather stringent
standards applicable to the necessity of that inquiry (see note 89 infra) indicate that there are few
instances when absence of the inquiry will make for an involuntary plea. That is, there will be few
cases showing necessary impact beyond what failure to understand the maximum penalty connotes.
Vol. 1970:2891
Washington University Open Scholarship
318 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
f. Parole Eligibility and Special Sentencing Statutes
The next two areas of inquiry indicated in the questionnaire, parole
eligibility and special sentencing statutes, are not generally necessary
areas of inquiry. If, however, either may have an impact on the potential
sentence a defendant must serve, they do become absolutely necessary
and mandatory. Limited parole eligibility was at one time considered a
"collateral consequence"' 6 of a conviction on a plea of guilty-once
characterized as a matter of "legislative grace" rather than "judicial
consequence."8 As such, it was usually held that a defendant pleading
guilty need not be informed before acceptance of his plea that he would
be ineligible for parole.s More recent decisions, however, require the
trial cpurt to apprise the defendant of parole ineligibility, or limited right
to propation. 89 One court holding the contrary has recently retreated 0
The key here is ineligibility-no case has held that the judge must
explain at length the parole system as it may apply to the defendant.
Thus, as phrased in the questionnaire ["Parole Eligibility (especially if
limited or not available)"], the area of inquiry is necessary when parole
eligibility is limited or not available.
If a special sentencing statute will have an impact on length of
sentence to be served on a guilty plea conviction, it is an essential
inquiry. A guilty plea is invalid, for lack of understanding of the
consequences, if the defendant is sentenced under provisions of which he
is not aware." The familiar example is the Federal Youth Corrections
86. E.g., Trujillo v. United States, 377 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 899 (1967);
Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Fimmano v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 938
(S.D. N.Y. 1970); cf. Fong v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 79 (D.C. Ore. 1968); Anushevitz v.
Warden, Nev. State Prison, -_ Nev. _ 467 P.2d 115 (1970).
87. Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 436,441 (D.C.Cir. 1963).
88. See cases cited in note 86 supra.
89. See, e.g.. Bye v. United States, - F.2d - 8 Crim. L. Rep. 2077 (2d Cir. 10-14-70),
Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969); Berry v. United States, 412 F.2d 189 (3d Cir.
1969); Alomino v. United States, 420 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1969); Munich v. United States, 337 F.2d
356 (9th Cir. 1964).
90. Spradley v. United States, 421 F.2d 1043 (5th Cir. 1970) (adopting Durant, the court limited
Trujillo to its facts).
91. E.g., Hansen v. Mathews,424 F.2d 1205, 1209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, -_ U.S. -90 S.
Ct. 1404 (1970) (recidivist statute); Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963) (Youth
Corrections Act); McCullough v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 740, 741 (N.D. Fla. 1964); People v.
Levi, 33 App. Div. 2d 566, 305 N.Y.S.2d 745 (1969) (36 months of custody as an addict); State v.
Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1969). Contra Kelley v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 1367
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) [finding eligibility for recidivist statute a collateral consequence (see notes 95-103
infra)].
There appears in some cases to be a limiter on this, Le., that the rule applies to quantity not
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Act under which a "youth" may receive, because of his status, a greater
sentence than would an adult offender.92 As in the case of parole, the key
is potential impact on the length of sentence. Thus, ajudge who explains
sentencing possibilities for adults and those under the Federal Youth
Corrections Act, without stating which he would apply, was held to have
adequately informed the defendant of the consequences of his plea.93
Recidivist statutes are other familiar examples and, if they apply, an
inquiry must be made to demonstrate that the defendant understands
their importance to him.
Survey responses on the parole eligibility inquiry tended toward the
mean and even toward "unnecessary" in some categories. Only U.S.
Attorneys characterized the inquiry as "absolutely necessary" [see
Table I supra]. In view of the phrasing of the questionnaire, these
responses must be seen as mainly erroneous. The special sentencing
statutes inquiry was seen generally as necessary and by federal judges,
U.S. Attorneys and professors as "absolutely necessary." It is
instructive to compare the letter with the less positive responses of state
judges [see Table I supra]. In neither area of inquiry were questions
asked or information given in St. Louis arraignments [seeTable 2 infra].
The absence, of course, reflects the general inapplicability of such
inquiry, not a failing of St. Louis courts, except to the extent that those
courts failed to inform defendants of any sentencing possibilities.
g. Collateral Consequences
-Consequences of the plea" has been historically divided into
"direct" and "collateral" (sometimes "civil") categories. 4 Direct
consequences include matters such as potential sentencing ranges,
considered above. Collateral consequences, on the other hand, need not
quality of treatment. See, e.g., State v. English, - Kan. _ , 424 P.2d 601, rehearing denied,
- Kan. - 424 P2d 601 (1967) (failure to advise of commitment provisions of a Sex Offenders
Act did not render the plea involuntary--commitment was for a definite term equivalent to sentence
provisions). Attention to quality in at least one court reached a result that, because commitment of
a sex offender was designed to "treat" not "punish", the special sentencing provision was not a
consequence. Butler v. Burke, 360 F.2d 118 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835 (1966).
92 18 US.C. §§ 5005 et seq. (1969). See also Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th
Cir [962); Kotz v. United States, 353 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1965); McCullough v. United States, 231
F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Fla. 1964).
93 Combs v, United States, 391 F2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1968).
94. Advice at arraignment as to the possible penal consequences of a plea of guilty indirectly
serves the possibility that the prospect of a short term of imprisonment might induce an
innocent man to plead guilty. But advice as to civil consequences [loss of the right to vote and
hold public office] seems totally unrelated to the accuracy of a plea of guilty.
People v. Thomas, 41 I11. 2d 122, 126,242 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1968).
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be understood for the entry of a voluntary plea.95 Included are such
consequences as loss of the right to vote," loss of reputation,97 loss of the
right to hold public office,9" deportation,99 and a permanent police
record.' The non-necessity of inquiry regarding a defendant's
appreciation of the collateral consequences of his plea seems well settled.
What constitutes a "collateral" consequence remains obscure. For
example, parole ineligibility is now characterized as a direct
consequence,101 although once classified as a collateral consequence
about which a defendant need not be informed. 02 Other collateral
consequences, deportation conspicuously ,13 have chimerical
characteristics of "directness" which may eventually lead to a similar
shift in classification.
Properly, survey responses generally regarded collateral consequences
as an unnecessary inquiry [see Table 1 supra]. Regretably no effort was
made in the questionnaire to explore specific collateral items, such as
deportation. No questions in this area were asked in the arraignments
viewed [see Table 2 infra].
95. E.g., United States ex rel. Brooks v. McMann, 408 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1969), vacated.
U.S. -, 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970); Sanchez v. United States, 417 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1969); Meaton v.
United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 959 (1965); Redwine v. Zuckert,
317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam); United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919, rehearing
denied, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 840 (1954); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp.
803, 807 (D. Utah 1968); People v. Thomas, 41 111. 2d 122, 252 N.E.2d 177 (1968); State v.
Medearis, 165 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1969). But see United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 186 (3d
Cir. 1963) [in this coram nobis proceeding the loss of vote was raised-the holding, that it was not
reasonable for the trial court to anticipate a move to New York 16 years in the future (in the state
where convicted loss of vote would not have been a consequence) infers that collateral consequences
may be "direct consequences", at least in the third circuit].
96. People v. Thomas, 41 Ill. 2d 122, 242 N.E.2d 177 (1968). But see United States v. Cariola,
323 F.2d 180 (3d Cir. 1963).
97. United States v. Cariola, 323 F.2d 180, 182 (3d Cir. 1963).
98. Meaton v. United States, 328 F.d 379 (Sth Cir. 1964); People v. Thomas, 41 Ill. 2d 122,242
N.E.2d 177 (1968). But see United States v. Cariola, 323 F2d 180, 186 (3d Cir. 1963).
99. United States v. Parrino, 212 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1954) (the court reached this decision based
on the merely collateral nature of the consequence, in spite of its recognition of "the terrific impact
on the defendant's life and family of the collateral consequence of deportation").
100. People v. Thomas, 41 Ill. 2d 122, 242 N.E.2d 177 (1968). Among other things found to be
collateral consequences are: an "undesirable' discharge from the Air Force, Redwine v. Zuckert,
317 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (per curiam); loss of passport and foreign travel privileges, Meaton v.
United States, 328 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1964).
101. See notes 89-90 supra and accompanying text.
102. See, e.g., Smith v. United States,324 F.2d 436 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
103. See note 99 supra.
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h. Constitutional Rights
Survey questions 15 through 18 relate to those constitutional rights
waived by the plea of guilty; the right to trial by jury, to confront and
cross-examine accusers, privilege against self-incrimination, and right to
compulsory process of witnesses. Of the four, the right to trial by jury as
long been held an essential element in the colloquy surrounding the
acceptance of a guilty plea,'" usually asked in terms such as "do you
know that you have a right to a trial by jury where you are presumed
innocent?" Less frequently, the inquiry may state in addition the
alternative availability of trial by judge. Curiously, the other rights have
not been the subject of much case law or statute save in cases approving
a particular arraignment interrogation.'" The reason for this disparity is
possibly a view that the other rights are included and implicit in the right
to trial by jury. An extension of such reasoning however, means
approval of such questions as "do you understand your legal rights?",'"
with the question "are you voluntarily and understandingly entering this
plea?",' use of this question alone is inadequate.
It is of course the law that a waiver of constitutional rights must be
voluntary, understanding and knowing. 08 To meet these criteria,
104. Eg., In reTahl, I Cal.3d 122,460 P.2d 449,81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969), Brown v. State, 250
A.2d 503, 505 (Del. 1969); People v. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 230, 233, 242 N.E.2d 242, 243 (1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969); Silverberg v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 7 Md. App. 657,658-59,256
A 2d 821, 822 (1969); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 155 N.W.2d 723 (1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1969); Copenhaver v. State, 431 P.2d 669, 674 (Okla.
Crim Ct. App. 1967); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, - 264 A.2d 643, 646 (1970);
COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11. See also Resolution of the Judges of the U.S. District Court of the District of
Columbia (June 24, 1964) cited in Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d 979,980 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
comment of the Criminal Procedural Rules Committee to PA. R. CRIM. P. 319 (Vernon Supp.
1970); cf. Gibson v. Boles, 288 F. Supp. 472,475 n. 4 (N.D. W. Va. 1968) (arraignment question
approved by the court); Drake v. State, 42 Wis. 2d 226, 231, 172 N.W.2d 664, 666 (1969); S.D.
Comp L. § 23-35-19 (1967).
105. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 303 F. Supp. 960, 962 (D. S.D. 1969)
(citing with approval arraignment interrogation which touched on the right to confront and cross-
examine, and the right to compulsory process of witnesses); In reTahl, 1 Cal.3d 122,460 P.2d 449,
81 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1969) (right to confront accusers; privilege against self-incrimination), People v.
Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333,340, 155 N.W.2d 723,727 (1968) (suggesting that the right to process of
witnesses be explained).
106. Goodwin v. State, 236 So. 2d 6 (D. Ct. App. Fla. 1970) (following representations of
counsel that rights and consequences had been explained to defendant, the court asked: "Do you feel
you have a full understanding of all your legal rights?" "Yes, sir.' The plea was voluntary).
107. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
108. See especially Silverberg v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 7 Md. App. 657, 256 A.2d 821
(1969). Silverberg requires a showing on the record that the accused intelligently and
understandingly waived his rights (1) to not incriminate himself, (2) to a trial by jury, and (3) to
confront and cross-examine his accusers. Id. at _ 256 A.2d at 822.
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questions such as "do you understand your right to a trial by jury?" are
wholly inadequate because they are devoid of explanation to persons
without legal training. More specifically, the state's burden of proof, the
presumption of innocence, the right to challenge the testimony of
accusers and rebut with a defense, and protection against self-
incrimination are facets of a defendant's "legal rights" which he ought
to know about. Since the assumption that counsel has informed the
defendant may no longer be safely indulged," 9 a defendant should be
informed in some detail about the rights he waives before a waiver is
permitted. McCarthy indicates that the trial judge must personally
address the defendant and inform him of these rights during the
arraignment and before the plea is offered.1'
Survey responses generally indorsed the jury trial inquiry as
"absolutely necessary" but showed declining interest in the other named
rights [see Table 1 supra]. Although these responses may reflect prior
judicial approach to this area of inquiry, in view of McCarthy and
Boykin,"' the validity of the responses seems short-term. The record of
St. Louis courts in inquiring or informing of these rights was dismal. In
arraignments viewed, 63% of state and 44% of federal judges discussed
the right to a jury trial with the defendant; 33% of state and 19% of
federal arraignment interrogations dealt with the right to confront and
corss-examine accusers; the privilege against self-incrimination was
discussed in 17% of the state and none of the federal arraignments; and
no information or inquiry in either system considered the right to
subpoena witnesses [see Table 2 infra]. In short, the St. Louis court
practice in regard to these rights was woefully inadequate from the
standpoint of the Supreme Court's decisions and the survey responses.
109. E.g., State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,548 (Iowa 1969); Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 661,674,
170 N.W.2d 713, 719 (1969). Under federal Rule II this assumption could probably never be
indulged in. But see cases cited in note 64 supra.
110. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459,466 (1969).
111. See, e.g., United States ix rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790,795 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 924 (1969); United States ex rel. McDonald v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 447,451 (3d
Cir. 1965); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803 (D. Utah 1968); Ware v. State, 219 So. 2d 910,912
(Ala. App. 1969); State v. Nestor, - Ariz. App. - 449 P.2d 315 (1969); Brown v. State, 250
A2d 503,505 (Del. 1969); Peoplev. Brown, 41 Ill. 2d 230,233,242 N.E.2d 242,243 (1968); State v.
Sisco, 169 N:W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1969); Duvall v. State, 5 Md. App. 484, 248 A.2d 401 (1968);
People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App, 333, 338, 155 N.W.2d 723, 725 (1968); State c rel. Burnett V.
Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,494, 126 N.W.2d 91, 95-96 (1964) [mandatory by Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d
661,674, 170 N.W.2d 713,719 (1969)]; ALAS. R. CRIM. P. 1I; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM.
P. 1.170; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; 2 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 556 (1967); ME. R. CrIM. P. I1; MONT.
Rav. CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (cum. supp. 1969); NEV. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (1969); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 62-3-la (1966).
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i. Nature of the Charges
I t is well settled that a defendant must, as a matter of fundamental due
process, understand the nature of the charges against him."'
Both the survey [see Table 1 supra] and the St. Louis court practice
[see Table 2 infra], consistent with the case law, required an inquiry of
and explanation to the defendant of the nature of charge to which the
plea is offered.
j. Lesser Included Offenses
The principal utility of informing a defendant of lesser included or
alternate offenses before acceptance of his guilty plea is to apprise him of
his bargaining position.Y3 By a plea of guilty, the defendant waives his
right to trial by jury and, its concommitant, that a jury may find, at its
option, guilt of a lesser offense or of only some counts as well as acquit.
These options available to a jury comprise, in part, the range of possible
"bargains" available to the defendant. Only if a defendant is fully aware
of this range can it be accurately infered that he is aware of the
consequence of his bargained plea and his bargaining leverage. At least
one decision, Belgarde v. Turner, has suggested that the trial court
should inform the defendant of alternate charges which might
conceivably encompass the acts committed by him."4
Quite obviously, this type of information will be known by the
defendant's attorney and, under most circumstances, be communicated
112. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Crosby v. Brierley, 404 F.2d 790, 795 n.6 (3d Cir. 1968),
cert denied, 395 U.S. 924 (1969); United States e rel. McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pa., 343
F 2d 447, 451 (3d Cir. 1965); Semon v. Turner, 289 F. Supp. 803 (D. Utah 1968); Ware v. State,
- Ala. App. - 219 So. 2d 910,912 (1969); State v. Nestor, -_ Ariz. App. - 449 P.2d
315 (1%9), Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503,505 (Del. 1969); People v. Brown, 41 111.2d 230,233,242
N E 2d 242, 243 (1968); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1969); Duvall v. State, 5 Md.
App 484, 248 A.2d 401 (1968); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 338, 155 N.W.2d 723, 725
(1%8), rev'd on other grounds, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970); State ex rel. Burnett v.
Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,494, 126 N.W.2d 91,95-96 (1951) [mandatory by Ernst v. State, 43 Wis. 2d
661,674,170 N.W.2d 713,719 (1969)]; ALAS. R. CRIM. P. 11; COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRiNM.
P 1 170; Ky. R. CRIM. P. 8.08; 2 LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 556 (1967); ME. R. CRIM. P. 11; MONT.
RFv CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (cum. supp. 1969); NEv. REV. STAT. § 174.035 (1969); W. VA.
CoDE ANN. § 62-3-la (1966). This understanding isviewed as an essential dueprocess requirement.
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,334 (1941).
113 Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, rev'don rehearing, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1957) (en
banc), rev'don confession of error, 356 U.S. 26 (1958) (per curiam).
114. Belgrade v. Turner, 421 F2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1970) [defendant offered to plead guilty to
nighttime burglary but stated the burglary took place at dawn. Failure of the trial court to explain
the difference between nighttime burglary (with a 6 month-3 year range of sentence) and daytime
burglary (I to 20 year range of sentence possible) rendered the plea invalid as not understandingly
entered].
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to the defendant by his attorney. Boykin, under the most liberal of
interpretations, requires only that this communication be revealed on the
record. In the usual case, that of an unrepresented defendant, the judge's
inquiry should presumably be more extensive.
Survey responses (question 20) did not generally favor informing
defendants of lesser included offenses [see Table 1 supra]. This inquiry
was not heard in any St. Louis arraignment [see Table 2 infra].
k. Circumstances under which a Plea may be Withdrawn
"Circumstances under which the plea may be withdrawn" was
unfortunate phrasing in the questionnaire. A more appropriate question
is whether the defendant understands that the plea of guilty cannot
automatically be withdrawn. The utility of such a question is to impress
the defendant with the finality and portent of his act; since the situation
should speak for itself, this is a rather limited "utility". Furthermore, if
McCarthy's characterization of large numbers of specious habeas
corpus suits is accurate, no one is, in any event, taking the finality of the
guilty plea conviction very seriously. In view of efforts facilitating easier
withdrawal of reconsidered guilty pleas,"' it may no longer be an
accurate assertion by the trial judge anyway.
Thirty percent of state court arraignments featured admonition or
inquiry about the limited right to withdraw the plea. No federal
arraignment included either [see Table 2 infra]. Responses to the survey
indicate a low quantum of "necessity" for the inquiry [see Table 1
supra].
Although no reason for the high percentage of admonitions in the
state courts was apparent, it may be that this warning is serving as a
substitute for the numerous other arraignment inquiries which are not
made.
1. Satisfaction with Counsel
The assistance of an attorney is frequently considered to support a
presumption of voluntariness for a guilty plea." 6 Perhaps in response to
115. But see ABA 53-59.
116. See, e.g., McMann v. Richardson, - U.S. _ 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970). Boykin has been
viewed as generally undermining the inference that there is a high correlation between presence of
counsel and voluntariness. See, e.g., State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 548 (Iowa 1969); Ernst v.
State, 43 Wis. 2d 661, 673-74, 170 N.W.2d 713, 719 (1969). McMann, however, seems to support
the inference-shifting some arraignment burdens off of the trial courtjudge. Cf. People v. Thomas,
41 Ill. 2d 122, 126,242 N.E.2d 177, 179 (1968).
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the large number of post-conviction actions alleging incompetent
representation by counsel,1 7 several courts have begun asking defendants
whether consultation with their attorney has been adequate or, at least,
whether the defendant is satisfied with the job his attorney has done.118
The heavy weight given to assistance of counsel by the Supreme Court in
McMann v. Richardson suggests that the defendant's satisfaction with
his counsel is closely related to the voluntariness of his plea.', Moreover,
the Supreme Court made it clear in Von Moltke v. Gillies that any guilty
plea entered after unavoidably hasty consultation with counsel, should
be accepted with great caution.1i With the exception of state trial judges
and public defenders, "extent of consultation" (survey question 22), was
regarded as "absolutely necessary and appropriate" by persons
responding [see Table 1 supra]. In St. Louis arraignments the inquiry
was made in 47% of state cases and 69% of federal cases [see Table 2
infral.
m. Cautionary Instruction
Because a guilty plea may be invalid if a promise of leniency is not
honored, judges, with increasing frequency, expressly indicate to a
defendant that they are not bound by any promises made by anyone to
the defendant.' 2' Absence of such a warning when coupled with an
unfulfilled promise, will automatically allow withdrawal of the plea.'2
On the other hand, cautions to the defendant by the judge that he is not
bound by any promises, when appearing in the arraignment record
substantially increases defendant's burden of showing that the promises
117. For a statement of the problem, see Brown v. State, 250 A.2d 503,505 (Del. 1969).
118. See, e.g., Ware v. State, -. Ala. App. - 219 So. 2d 910 (1969); State v. Carpenter,
__ Ariz. - 467 P.2d 749,751 (1970); Brown v. State, 250A.2d 503,505 (Del. 1969).See notes
129-135 supra. Cf. McMann v. Richardson, -. U.S. _ 90 S.Ct. 1441 (1970).
119. See notes 64-65 supra and accompanying text; Cross v. State, 452 S.W.2d 854 (Ark. 1970);
cf. State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1969).
120. 332 U.S. 708 (1947).
121 . See. e.g., Cross v. State, 452 S.W.2d 854 (Ark. 1970); Brown v. State, 234 So. 2d 161 (Fla.
App. 1970); Moore v. State, 216 So. 2d 766 (Fla. App. 1968); State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,548
(Iowa 1969); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333, 338, 155 N.W.2d 723, 726 (1968), rev'd on other
grounds, 383 Mich. 338, 175 N.W.2d 715 (1970); Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, _
264 A.2d 643,646 (1970); In re Lamphere, - Vt.__ 256 A.2d 29 (1969); cf. United States ex
rel McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963); United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256
F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); State v. Roach, 447 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1969); People v. Stevenson,
300 N.Y.S.2d 674 (N.Y. App. 1969); Adcock v. State, 461 P.2d 960 (Okla. 1969); Note, Guilty Plea
Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865-68
(1964).
122. E.g., Cross v. State, 452 S.W.2d 854 (Ark. 1970).
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induced an involuntary plea.' This inquiry, therefore, has utility in
post-conviction proceedings by supporting the initial trial court
determination that the plea was voluntary. The inquiry is mandatory in
some jurisdictions. ' 4
Most questionnaire responses indicated that a judge's inquiry as to
"defendant's understanding that the Judge is not bound to the
prosecutor's recommendation" is necessary. Appellate judges, Legal
Aid Lawyers, public defenders and law school faculty indicated their
opinion that such an inquiry is "absolutely necessary" [see Table 1
supra]. There was, however, such inquiry in only 20% of the state court
arraignments viewed in St. Louis [see Table 2 infra]. The federal judge's
responses indicated that federal courts do not commonly request U.S.
Attorneys' recommendations, therefore, the inquiry was not relevant to
federal practice.
3. Waiver of Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel extends to
arraignments in both federal'24 and state courts. 2 Counsel's advice prior
to a defendant's plea of guilty undoubtedly is, in many cases, a primary
source of a defendant's "understanding of the consequences". When and
if a defendant waives counsel and appears at arraignment offering to
plead guilty,' z2 it is the trial judge's responsibility prior to acceptance of
the plea to assure that the defendant is intelligently and voluntarily
waiving the advice and assistance of counsel, appointed or otherwise. 2 1
This duty includes more than mechanically reciting the accused's
"Miranda" rights or requesting the defendant to perform the formality
of signing a waiver form.2
To discharge this duty properly in light of the strong presumption against
123. E.g., Moore v. State, 216 So. 2d 766 (Fla. App. 1968).
124. E.g., State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542,548 (Iowa 1969); People v. Taylor, 9 Mich. App. 333,
155 N.W.2d 723 (1968).
125. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1935).
126. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (196 1); cf.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963).
127. In some jurisdictions it may now be the practice of the trial judges to never accept a guilty
plea from an unrepresented defendant. See letter from a public defender to Washington University
Law Quarterly, which indicates that the trial judge who handled both trials in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335 (1963), now refuses all tendered pleas from unrepresented defendants.
128. See VonMoltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1947); cf. People v. Brown, 242 N.E.2d 242, 243
(I11. 1968); MoNTr. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (Supp. 1969).
129. This case graphically illustrates that a mere routine inquiry-the asking of several
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waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, a judge must investigate as
long and as thoroughly as the circumstances of the case before him
demand. The fact that an accused may tell him that he is informed of his
right does not automatically end the judge's responsibility. To be valid
such waiver must be made with an apprehension of the nature of the
charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of
allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and
circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a
broad understanding of the whole matter. A judge can make certain that
an accused's professed waiver of counsel is understandingly and wisely
made only from a penetrating and comprehensive examination of all the
circumstances under which such a plea is tendered. 3
To accomplish this task as required by Von Moltke v. Gillies, it is clear
that the questions set out in the survey under "Waiver of Counsel" are
insufficient. However, if those latter inquiries are accompanied with
forthright inquiries like those set out in the remainder of the
questionnaire, a "formal" compliance is reasonably certain. 3 ' Anything
more than a routine inquiry may, of course, be initiated on the discretion
of the trial judge according to the circumstances of the case.
Specifically, it is absolutely necessary for the judge to inform the
defendant that he has a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel,
and that if he is without funds, an attorney will be provided . 32 With the
exception of state trial judges and public defenders, every response to the
questionnaire indicated that this information should always be conveyed
to the defendant at arraignment [see Table 1 infra]. In fact, a large
proportion of federal judges responding indicated that they do not accept
a guilty plea under any circumstances unless the defendant is represented
by counsel at arraignment. 3 3 As a result of this practice, the stringent
standards of Von Mo/tke would apparently come into play in the federal
system infrequently.
Several state decisions have suggested that a trial judge should inform
an unrepresented defendant prior to final waiver of counsel and plea that
standard questions followed by the signing of a standard written waiver of counsel-may
leave a judge entirely unaware of the facts essential to an informed decision that an accused
has executed a valid waiver of his right to counsel.
Von Moltke v. Gillies. 332 U.S. 708,724 (1947).
130 Id. at 723-24.
131 See the model set out in Drake v. State, 172 N.W.2d 664 (Wis. 1969).
132 See. e.g., United States ec rel. Miner v. Erickson, 303 F. Supp. 960 (D.S.D. 1969); Reiffv.
State, 164 N.W,2d 249 (Wis. 1969); Copenhaver i Ate, 431 P2d 669,674 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App.
1%7); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 95-1606 (e) (Supp. 1969).
133. Letters on file with Washington University Law Quarterly.
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an attorney's competence in difficult legal matters, such as the
admissability of evidence or development of defenses, will far exceed the
defendant's.lu Obviously the purpose behind such colloquy is to assure
that the defendant clearly understands the value of counsel's assistance.
In most cases this will probably be apparent to the defendant,
particularly if he has a record of prior convictions. Moreover, to the
extent a recidivist has decided that an attorney has been of no value to
him in the past, the inquiry will be of little meaning. These pragmatic
limitations on the utility of the inquiry are reflected in the questionnaire
responses, which generally rated this type of an inquiry by the trial judge
to be only moderately necessary [see Table 1 infra].
Just as in the case of a guilty plea, a waiver of counsel induced by
threats or promises is involuntary.1 35 Probably because waivers of
counsel only rarely are induced by official threat or promise, the
arraignment questionnaires indicated a fairly unanimous opinion that
any question inquiring about such threats is not quite absolutely
necessary [seeTable I infra]. In a similar vein, at least one state decision
has suggested that many defendants waive representation in the belief
that the trial judge will "reward" the waiver with a lowered sentence.,
Although these defendants are entertaining this belief without actually
having been promised any concessions, it may be that in courts where
this subjective conclusion is being drawn by defendants, some statement
should be made to the defendant negating the existence of any such
standard practice. 37 Clearly, any effort of this nature is not mandatory
under Boykin or Von Moltke, but it could be beneficial to unwise
defendants in jurisdictions where waiver occurs frequently.
134. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 172 N.W.2d 664,666 (Wis. 1969); State v. Linehan, 164 N.W.2d
616 (Minn. 1969); Ernst v. State, 170 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Wis. 1969) [making mandatory the
recommendation ofState ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,494, 126 N.W.2d 9I,95-6 (1964)
that the trial court should "alert the accused to the possibility that a lawyer may discover defenses
or mitigating circumstances which would not be apparent to a layman such as the accused."].
135. See State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke, 22 Wis. 2d 486,494, 126 N.W.2d 91,95-6 (1964); Ernst
v. State, 170 N.W.2d 713, 719 (Wis. 1969).
136. Some accused persons waive counsel in a desperate effort to curry favor. If one can
obtain a charge concession in exchange for a guilty plea, it is understandable that some may
believe additional concessions may be obtained by full 'co-operation', the waiving of
counsel. Newman, Pleading Guilty for Consideration: A Study of Bargain Justice, 46 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 780,783-785 (1956).
People v. Byrd, 162 N.W.2d 777,781 (Mich. App. 1968) (Levin, J., concurring).
137. See Ernst v. State, 170 N.W.2d 713,719 (Wis. 1969).
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III. ST. Louis ARRAIGNMENT DATA
The data on St. Louis arraignments was collected, principally by two
second year law students, during two months in the Spring and one in the
Summer of 1970 in St. Louis criminal courts and the federal district
court. These students transcribed arraignment interrogations by hand,
making an effort to get at least the sense of every question asked.
The St. Louis setting of this empirical effort is atypical in one respect:
the acceptance of guilty pleas in Missouri is governed by a statutory rule
incorporating several of federal Rule 11's substantive requirements.
Missouri Rule 25.04 provides:
Arraignment shall be conducted in open court and shall consist of reading
the indictment or information to the defendant or stating to him the
substance of the charge and calling on him to plead thereto. A defendant
may plead not guilty or guilty. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that the plea
is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge ....
(Emphasis added)
Although a growing number of states have similar statutory
requirements,'s the majority of states still lack them. The existence of an
express legislative mandate facilitates comparison of Missouri state
courts with the federal court practice under Rule 11 (note, however, that
the Missouri Rule does not require a demonstration on the record of an
accuracy determination). In each category of inquiry, therefore, data
was combined into an "All" arraignments summary. This combination,
in view of the similar rule requirements, is probably a legitimate device
in all but the accuracy categories [questions 19(b) and 19(e)] and the
judge's admonition as to his independence of the prosecutor's
recommendation (question 23), which is irrelevant to federal courts. In
general, the "All" category is useful in portraying the arraignment
process in St. Louis as a whole. The questions and their frequency are
indicated in Table 2. Areas of deficiency in the aggregate interrogation
sample were noted in Part II of this paper as to each specific area of
inquiry.
138 See statutes cited note 31 supra.
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TABLE 2: ST. Louis
ARRAIGNMENTS
State
[30 pleas
observed]
[Vol. 1970:289
Federal
[16 pleas
observed]
Total
[46 pleas
observed]
(I) Personal Data
(a) age of defendant 77% 88% 81%
[23/30] [14/161 [37/46]
(b) education of defendant 66% 88% 74%
[20/30] [14/161 [34/46]
(c) employment record of defendant 30% 12% 24%
[9/30] [2/161 [11/461
(d) homelife of defendant 60% 0% 39%
(marital status, etc.) [18/30] [0/16] [18/46]
(2) Mental Health (Mental 17% 6% 13%
Disease, Prior Commitment, Etc.) [5/30] [1/161 [6/46]
(3) Addictions
(a) narcotic 40% 0% 26%
[12/301 [0/161 [12/46]
(b) alcoholic 20% 0% 13%
[6/301 [0/16] [6/461
(4) Prior Convictions 50% 25% 41%
[15/30] [4/16] [19/46]
(5) Are You Voluntarily and 17% 17% 17%
Understandably Entering This Plea? [5/30] [3/16] [8/46]
(6) Threats, Coercion, Duress 30% 100% 54%
[9/301 [16/16] [25/46]
(7) Threats of Prosecution of Others - - -
(8) Promises of Sentence Concessions 57% 100% 72%
[17/30] [16/16] [33/46]
(9) Plea Bargains With Prosecutor - - -
(10) Specific Maximum and 53% 75% 61%
Minimum Sentence Range [16/30] [12/16] [28/46]
(11) Concurrent and/or Consecutive - - -
Sentencing Possibilities
(12) Parole Eligibility - -
(13) Qualification Under Special - - -
Sentencing Statutes
(14) Collateral Consequences of Plea - -
(15) Constitutional Right to 63% 44% 56%
Impartial Jury [19/30] [7/16] [26/46]
(16) Constitutional Right to Confront 33% 19% 28%
and Cross-Examine his Accusers [10/30] [3/16] [13/46]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/3
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State
[30 pleas
observed]
Federal
[16 pleas
observed]
(17) Constitutional Right Against 17% 0% 11%
Self-Incrimination [5/30] [0/16] [5/46]
(1) Constitutional Right to Compulsory - - -
Process for Witnesses
(19) Specific Nature of Charges in the Indictment
(a) prosecutor explains elements of 17% 0% 11%
crime to defendant [5/301 [0/16] [5/46]
Jb) defendant asked questions to 23% 81% 43%
establish elements of crime [7/30] 113/16] [20/46]
(c) prosecutor asked to read facts 43% 12% 33%
of indictment [13/30] [2/16] [15/46]
(d) judge reads facts of indictment 30% 62% 41%
[9/30] [10/191 [19/46]
(e) defendant asked to explain 17% 88% 41%
what occurred [5/30] [14/16] [19/46]
(20) Lesser Included Offenses - - -
(21) Circumstances Under Which a Plea May 30% 0% 20%
Be Withdrawn (That Once Accepted [9/30] [0/16] [9/46]
Can Not Be Automatically With-
drawn)
(22) Extent of Consultation with Counsel 47% 69% 54%
re all the Above [14/30] [11/16] [25/46]
(23) Extent of Defendant's Understanding 20% 0% 13%
that Judge not Bound to Honor Recom- [6/30] [0/16] [6/46]
mendations of Prosecutor
(24)-(27) Because not applicable, none of the pleas observed included questions relative to waiver
of counsel. All observed to plead guilty in the course of this study had assistance of counsel.
IV. CONCLUSION
McCarthy and Boykin have, in the short time since they were handed
down by the Supreme Court in 1969, spawned an enormous volume of
state and federal decisions. These appellate rulings have struggled to
define what a trial judge must or might do at arraignment to accomplish
an "on the record" demonstration of voluntariness for guilty pleas. Few,
if any, of these McCarthy-Boykin progeny have considered more than
one area of inquiry at a time. An aggregate of those decisions, however,
amounts to a somewhat lengthy but comprehensive scheme of inquiry at
arraignment. As is apparent from the case law surveyed, each area of
inquiry listed on the model arraignment questionnaire has been required
Total
[46 pleas
observed]
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or recommended in at least one jurisdiction. Responses to the
questionnaire indicate that a cross-section of criminal administration
personnel rates twenty-six out of the twenty-seven categories in the
questionnaire as "absolutely necessary" or "necessary" for an
acceptance of a tendered plea. Nonetheless, the Quarterly's study of
arraignments in state and federal St. Louis courts reveals that some trial
judges in those courts are not making any concerted effort to comply
with the mandates of McCarthy and Boykin. The various guilty plea and
waiver forms included in the Appendix suggest that there is in fact a wide
variance of compliance throughout the country. Particularly striking in
St. Louis was the failure of federal trial judges to inform defendants of
their right to a jury trial in 44% of the arraignments viewed by the
Quarterly staff. Because McCarthy expressly decided that absence of
this warning in the record represents automatic reversible error, it is
difficult to understand why this deficiency in procedure occurs. In part,
it may illustrate that there will be a time-lag following the Supreme
Court's decisions before compliance is fully achieved. On the other hand,
the answer here may be that trial court judges haven't the time or
resources available to develop any individual scheme for their acceptance
of guilty pleas, and are hard put to achieve formal compliance absent
some model to refer to during the hurried moments.of an arraignment.
This note, with its interrelated presentation of case law, opinion and
empirical data, is quite obviously designed to fill some of that vacuum.
Certainly the objectives asserted by the Supreme Court in McCarthy
and Boykin can only be accomplished if trial judges attempt to, and do,
synthesize and follow some form of "model" inquiry form such as that
suggested by the results of this survey.
[Vol. 1970:289
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Appendix I: Survey Results
The figures in this appendix show tabulations of all responses received during the survey before
the figures were compiled. The numbers to the left of the figures indicate the question nunber, the
left hand column represents an answer with a scored value of plus two, moving from left to right are
plus one, zero, minus one, and minus two. The figures are given by the category of respondent to the
questionnaire and totalled,
Appellate Judge (State)
(category)
1 2 2 -
2 2 1 1
3 2 I 1
4 2 I 1
5 4
6 4
7 3 1
8 4
9 3 1
10 4 -
I1 3 1
12 1 I 2
13 2 I 1
14 - I I 2
15 3 1 -
16 3 1
17 3 1
18 3 1
19 3 .
20 2 1 - I
21 2 1 -
22 4 . . .
23 4
24 4
2i 1 1 2
26 I 3 -
27 3 - 1 - -
Appellate Judge (Federal)
(category)
1 4 1 - - -
2 5 1
3 3 3
4 2 I - 3 -
5 6 - -
6 6 --
7 4 1
8 6 - - - -
9 4 I
10 4 1 1
1I 3 - 1 I -
12 2 I 1 2 -
13 6 - - -
14 - I 1 1 3
15 4 1 - - 1
16 4 I 
17 4 I 
18 4 I 1
19 4 1 1
20 - 2 3 - 1
21 1 - 3 - 2
22 5 1 - -
23 4 - - I -
24 6 - . .
25 3 I I -
26 2 3 - -
27 4 I - - -
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Trial Judge (State)
(category)
3 5 2
1 5 2
5 4 1
6 3 3
! - -
- - 1
2 5 1
1 2
I 1 I
3 2 -
3 2 1
1 4 3
4 3 3
2 8 4
1 1 -
1 3 -
1 2 -
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
8
9
7
5
16
17
8
16
14
13
9
9
7
1
16
13
13
Trial Judge (Federal)
(category)
I 1 1 3 3 3 I
2 13 7 1 - -
3 9 8 3 - 1
4 2 1 8 3 7
5 21 - - -
6 21 - - -
7 9 3 7 2
8 19 i ___
9 13 4 2 i -
10 21 - - -
11 I1 4 1 3 2
12 6 2 4 4 4
13 16 4 2 - -
14 1 1 6 8 5
15 20 - I -
16 17 1 2 I -
17 18 - 2 1 -
18 14 2 3 1 1
19 21 - - -
20 3 7 6 3 2
21 3 3 3 4 7
22 16 2 2 I -
23 1I 5 1 - 1
24 21 - - -
25 9 6 2 3 -
26 8 6 2 4 -
27 14 2 I 2 -
1 2 2 1 4
7 4 5 1 3
2 5 6 3 3
15 - - - 4
15 - 1 2 1
14 - I - 2
10 - 4 - I
9 2 4 1 -
14 - 1 -
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Public Defenders
(category)
6 - 4 2
2 4 3 I 4 -
3 2 2 4 4 -
4 2 2 2 4 2
5 10 - 1 1
6 10 I -1
7 6 I I 2 2
9 2 1
9 9 1 1 1
10 8 2 2
I1 10 - 2
12 7 1 3 1 -
13 7 1 2 I 1
14 2 - 3 5 2
15 8 2 1 1
16 8 1 - 3
17 7 1 3 -
18 5 2 1 4
19 10 - 1 1 -
20 2 1 3 3 3
21 4 1 2 3 2
22 9 1 1 1
23 10 I 1
24 9 - 1 i
25 7 1 1 1 I
26 7 1 2
Legal Aid Attorney
(category)
!
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
7 1 2 - -
7 2 - - -
7 1 ! - -
2 3 1 1 2
9 . . . .
9 . . . .
6 1 - 1
7 - 1 i -
7 - 1 -
7 1 1 - -
7 - 2 - -
5 1 2 -
6 2 I - -
3 3 - 1 2
6 - 1 - 2
5 2 - 1
7 1 - - i
5 - 2 1 1
9 . . . .
5 1 1 - 2
5 1 - - 3
9 . . . .
7 2 - - -
9 . . . .
7 2 - - -
7 - -
9 1I 1- - 27 7 [1I- - 1
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U.S. Attornies
(category)
1 3 - 2 - -
2 2 1 2 - -
3 2 1 2 - -
4 1 3 1 - -
5 5 - -
6 5 - -
7 5 - -
8 5 - -
9 3 I - 1 -
10 4 I - - -
!1 3 2 - - -
12 4 - ! - -
13 4 1 - - -
14 1 - 2 2 -
15 4 - ! - -
16 3 1 - 1 -
17 3 1 - 1 -
18 3 - I 1 -
19 5 -- -
20 2 1 1 1 -
21 1 - 1 2 1
22 4 - 1 - -
23 3 1 1 - -
24 4 -- --
25 3 1 - - -
26 3 1 - - -
27 3 1 - - -
General Practitioner
(category)
I 11 - 4 1 -
2 11 1 2 - -
3 8 2 1 3 -
4 2 6 2 3 I
5 14 - -
6 11 I -
7 6 4 2 - i
8 7 6 -
9 6 3 2 2 1
0 10 2 I - I
I1 4 7 3 - -
2 4 4 3 2 1
3 7 5 2 - -
4 2 2 6 2 2
5 12 - 2 - -
6 10 1 3 - -
7 10 - 4 - -
8 8 3 2 2 -
9 14 - - I -
!0 5 5 3 2 -
21 8 - 2 3 1
2 1I 2 I - -
23 7 2 4 I -
.4 14 - - -
5 8 2 3 2 -
!6 7 4 3 - -
27 10 2 - - I
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(category)
1 4
2 4
3 3 I 1
4 2 1
2
55
4
3
4
4
3
3
2
5
2
2
6
7
9
10
I1
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
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All Responses
(category)
1 56 10 20 9 2
2 57 17 12 7 2
3 43 24 16 9 3
4 20 24 17 18 14
5 90 1 1 - 3
6 88 2 - 1 3
7 49 14 18 5 7
8 78 8 5 1 1
9 64 11 7 7 2
10 76 10 6 - 3
11 54 17 11 5 4
12 41 11 18 13 11
13 59 19 10 5 3
14 14 10 27 23 21
15 76 6 7 1 5
16 66 10 9 6 4
17 67 8 9 5 5
18 55 12 j13 10 7
19 89 1 1 2 3
20 30 23 22 11 11
21 30 11 17 16 20
!2 78 6 4 2 5
23 66 11 8 4 2
!4 86 - 2 - 3
!5 51 14 14 7 3
!6 47 21 13 6 2
!7 r68 8 12 5 3
4 1 -
4 1
5
5 ..
5 ..
3 - 1 1
3 1 1 -
4 1
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Appendix ii: Sample Arraignment Questionnaires and Forms
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
) NO. CR
VS. )
PETITION TO ENTER PLEA OF GUILTY)
[Fed. R. Crim. Proc., Rules 10 and II]
Defendant. )
The defendant represents to the Court:
(1) My full true name is:
and I request that all proceedings against me be had in that name.
(2) I am represented by a lawyer; his name is
(3) 1 received a copy of the indictment* before being called upon to plead. I read the indict-
ment and have discussed it with my lawyer. I fully understand every charge made against me.
The following is the substance of the charge: (If there is more than one count, set forth the charge
in each count separately. If more space is needed, add a separate sheet.)
(4) 1 told my lawyer all the facts and circumstances known to me about the charges asserted
in the indictment. I believe that my lawyer is fully informed on all such matters. My lawyer has
counselled and advised with me on the nature of each charge and on all possible defenses that I
might have in this case.
(5) i understand that I may plead "Not Guilty" to any offense charged against me. If I choose
to plead "Not Guilty" the Constitution guarantees me (a) the right to a speedy and public trial
by jury, (b) the right to see and hear all witnesses called to testify against me, (c) the right
to use the power and process of the Court to compel the production of any evidence, including
the attendance of any witnesses in my favor, and (d) the right to have the assistance of a lawyer
at all stages of the proceedings.
(6) 1 also understand that if I plead "GUILTY" the Court may impose the same punishment as
if I had pleaded "'Not Guilty," stood trial and been convicted by ajury.
(7) My lawyer informed me that the maximum punishment which the law provides for the
offense charged in the indictment is: A maximum of years imprisonment and
a fine of $ for the offense charged in
of the indictment.
I am years old. I understand that the Court may sentence me under the provisions
of the Youth Corrections Act or as a Young Adult Offender for an indeterminate sentence
[18 U.S.C. § 5010(b)], which may require me to spend as long as six (6) years in a penal insti-
tution. [This paragraph is applicable only if the defendant is at the date hereof at least 18 years of
age and not more than 26 years of age.]
(8) I declare that no officer or agent of any branch of government (Federal, State or local)
nor my lawyer, nor any other person, has made any promise or suggestion of any kind to me, or
within my knowledge to anyone else, that I will receive a lighter sentence, or probation, or any
other form of leniency if I plead "GUILTY."
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(9) 1 believe that my lawyer has done all that anyone could do to counsel and assist me, AND
I AM SATISFIED WITH THE ADVICE AND HELP HE HAS GIVEN ME.
(10) 1 know that the Court will not permit anyone to plead "GUILTY" who claims to be
innocent and, with that in mind and because I am "GUILTY" and make no claim of innocence,
I wish to plead "GUILTY" and respectfully request the Court to accept my plea of "GUILTY"
and to have the Clerk enter my plea of -GU I LTY" as follows: (*)
(IH) I OFFER MY PLEA OF "GUILTY" FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY AND OF
MY OWN ACCORD AND WITH FULL UNDERSTANDING OF ALL THE MATTERS
SET FORTH IN THE INDICTMENT AND IN THIS PETITION AND IN THE CERTI-
FICATE OF MY LAWYER WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THIS PETITION.
(12) 1 further state that I wish to waive the reading of the indictment in open court, and I
request the Court to enter my plea of "GUILTY" as set forth above in Paragraph (10) of this
petition.
Signed by me in open court in the presence of my attorney this - day of_
19__
Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
The undersigned, as lawyer and counsellor for the defendant
hereby certifies:
(I) I have read and fully explained to the defendant the allegations contained in the indictment
in this case.
(2) To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements, representations and declarations
made by the defendant in the foregoing petition are in all respects accurate and true.
(3) I explained the maximum penalty for each count to the defendant, and since the defendant
is - years of age, I informed him that he may be sentenced under the provisions of the
Youth Corrections Act or as a Young Adult Offender and that if he is given an indeterminate
sentence under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) he may be required to spend as much as
six (6) years in a penal institution.
(4) The plea of "GUILTY" offered by the defendant in paragraph (10) accords with my
understanding of the facts he related to me and is consistent with my advice to the defendant.
(5) In my opinion the defendant's waiver of reading of the indictment in open court as
provided in Rule 10 is voluntarily and understandingly made, and I recommend to the Court
that the waiver be accepted by the Court.
(6) In my opinion the plea of "GUILTY" as offered by the defendant in paragraph (10) of the
petition is voluntarily and understandingly made. I recommend that the Court accept 'the plea
of "GUILTY."
Signed by me in open court in the presence of the defendant above named and after full dis-
cussion of the contents of this certificate with the defendant, this - day of
Is
Attorney for the Defendant
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ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant's plea of "GUILTY" be accepted and entered as
prayed for in the petition and as recommended in the certificate of his lawyer.
Done in open court this - day of_ _ 19
United States District Judge
MINNESOTA DISTRICT COURT-NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
(OFFER TO PLEAD GUILTY)
I. What is your name and age?
2. How far did you go in school?
3. Have you ever been a patient in a mental hospital or institution?
4. Do you now believe or have you ever believed yourself to be mentally ill or mentally in-
competent in any respect?
5. Have you received a copy of the (Indictment) (Information) before entering this plea of
guilty?
6. Have you read it?
7. Have you discussed it with your attorney?
8. Do you understand the accusation(s) made against you in this case?
9. Do you understand you are charged with committing the crime of
in the of
County of State of Minnesota, on the - day of
19_."
10. Have you told your attorney all the facts and surrounding circumstances concerning
the crime with which you are charged?
II. Are you satisfied that your attorney is fully informed as to all such matters?
12. Have you had sufficient time to discuss this case with your attorney?
13. Have you been fully advised by your attorney as to all aspects of the case including your
legal rights?
14. Has your attorney counselled and advised you as to the nature and cause of the accusation(s)
against you, and as to any possible defenses you might have in this case?
15. Are you satisfied that your attorney has adequately and competently represented your
interests and fully advised you of your legal rights?
16. Do you understand that if you (entered a plea of Not Guilty) (continued in your plea of
Not Guilty) you would be entitled to a trial by a jury of twelve persons, or by a judge without
a jury if you prefer to waive a jury trial?
17. Do you understand that you would be entitled to have the services of an attorney through-
out the trial?
18. Do you understand that at a trial the jury would be instructed that you are presumed to be
innocent?
19. Do you understand that upon a trial, the State would be required to prove you guilty
of the charge made against you beyond a reasonable doubt and the jury would be so instructed?
20. Do you understand that had this case proceeded to trial you could testify or not testify,
as you choose, and that no comment could be made by the prosecutor or the court about your failure
to testify if you decided not to testify?
21. Do you understand that if you had a trial by jury there could be no conviction unless
all 12 jurors voted unanimously for the conviction?
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22. Do you understand that if you had a trial, the State would be required to produce in
open court the witnesses against you, and that you would have a right through your attorney
to cross-examine the witnesses?
23. Do you understand that at such trial you would be entitled to offer evidence in your
defense, if you so choose?
24. Do you understand that you are pleading guilty to a (felony) (gross misdemeanor) and
that as a result of your plea of guilty the court may sentence you to imprisonment or confine-
ment in a penal institution for a period not to exceed years or a fine up to $
or both?
25. Do you claim to be innocent of this crime for any reason?
26. Do you claim to have any defense against this charge?
27. Are you pleading guilty with a full awareness that in fact you are guilty of the crime
charged?
28. Do you understand that the court will not accept a plea of guilty from anyone who claims
to be innocent?
29. Tell me in your own language what you did in this case?
30. Do you claim to have been under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of this
offense?
31. Do you claim you did not know what you were doing at the time of this offense?
32. Do you understand that the State seeks to offer in evidence:
a. -Evidence obtained as a result of a search and seizure?
b. - Evidence discovered because of a confession or statements in the nature of
a confession obtained fror you?
c - Confessions or statements in the nature of confessions made by you?
33. Is your guilty plea based in any way on the State's intention to offer the evidence just
mentioned?
(If) the answer is "yes", inquire into the admissibility of such evidence and advise defendant of
his right to possibly suppress.)
34. Have you been advised that you have a right to a hearing before trial to have the court
decide upon the admissibility of the State's evidence?
35 Has your attorney advised you about your possible right to have the State's evidence
be not admitted against you?
36. Do you claim there is any reason why any evidence of the State should not be admitted
against you?
37 Is it your desire to demand or to waive your right to contest the constitutional admissibility
of this evidence?
19 Has any officer or agent of any branch of government (Federal, State or local), or any
other person, made any promises, threats, or inducements to lead you to plead guilty?
39. Do you further understand that your plea of guilty to this offense could constitute a
basis for revocation of any probation or parole that you are presently subject to, and that such
probation or parole could be revoked?
40. Do you know that your attorney and the County Attorney have discussed this matter with
the court?
41 Do you understand that your attorney and the County Attorney have recommended to the
court that you receive (a limited sentence of years) (probation) (etc.)?
42 Do you believe that recommended sentence is fair?
43 Do you have any objection to the court imposing the recommended sentence?
Washington University Open Scholarship
342 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1970:289
Summary No. I November, 1969
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Plaintiff, )
vs. ) No.)
Defendant, )
Plea of Guilty: Summary of Facts
(One Case)
I. Is the name just read to you your true name? A.
2. How old are you now?A. years of age.
3. Is Mr. your lawyer? A.
4. You know you are charged with
_A.
5. Have you and your lawyer had a copy of this charge? A.
6. Do you know that the maximum punishment provided for this crime is .
and that the minimum is
A.
7. You know that you are entitled to a jury trial on this charge? Do you waive this? A.
8. Have you talked over this case with your lawyer, understand your rights, and had his
counsel and advice in this matter? A.
9. Do you wish to enter a plea and be sentenced now? A.
10. What is your plea? A.
II. Do you plead guilty of your own free will, only for the reason that you are guilty, and you
admit you did the acts charged? A.
12. Have you been abused, mistreated, or threatened by anyone to have you enter this plea?
A.
13. (Memorandum of Sentence:)
14. Do you now understand that you have the right to appeal this judgment and sentence to the
Court of Criminal Appeals; to have an attorney represent you on such appeal, and if you are un-
able to hire an attorney the Court will provide an attorney for you; and that you are entitled to a
transcript, that is a full record of these proceedings, at public expense, if you are unable to pay for
it yourself? A.
15. You are now told that to appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals from this judgment
and sentence you must give notice of your intention to appeal and your request for a transcript,
both in writing and file such notice and request with the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days
from this date.
16. Do you wish to appeal from this judgment and sentence? A.
17. Do you wish an attorney to be appointed to appeal this case for you to the Court of Crim-
inal Appeals? A.
18. Do you wish to be provided with a transcript at public expense? A.
19. If these are not waived, you must be held in the county jail for ten (10 days. Do you under-
stand that? A.
20. Do you wish to be transported to the penitentiary immediately and not be held in the
county jail for the ten (10) days waiting period? A.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1970/iss3/3
Vol. 1970:289] VOLUNTARY GUILTY PLEAS 343
2 1. Have you fully understood the questions that have been asked you, and the answers you
have given to each question, and are they your free and voluntary answers to these questions
as made? A.
22. Above done in open Court this day of _ 19-
23. (This is to be iled in the case as a part of the trial minutes).
APPROVED:
Assistant District Attorney DISTRICT JUDGE
Attorney for Defendant Court Reporter present
The Defendant Deputy Court Clerk present
Summary No. 4 June, 1970 (2d)
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR OKLAHOMA COUNTY, STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA HOMA, ) No.
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,, ) No.
Plaintiff, ) No.
vs. ) No.)
Defendant.
SUSPENDED SENTENCE
PLEA OF GUILTY: SUMMAR YOF FACTS
(One or more cases)
I Is the name just read to you your true name? A.
2, How old are you now? A. years of age.
3, Is Mr. your lawyer? A.
4, You know you are charged with
_A.
5, Have you and your lawyer had a copy of the charge(s)? A.
6, Do you know that the maximum punishment provided for the crime(s) is imprisonment for
years and that the minimum is imprisonment for years? A.
7 Do you understand that on plea(s) of guilty you may be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment within those limits? A.
8. You know that you are entitled to a jury trial on the charge(s), (and to each one of
the charges)? Do you waive a jury trial? A.
9, Have you talked over the charge(s) with your lawyer, understand your rights, and had his
advice in the matter(s)? A.
10. Do you wish to enter your plea(s) now and be sentenced now? A.
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1I. What your plea(s) to the charge(s), (and to each one of them)? A. -
12. Do you plead guilty of your own free will, only for the reason that you are guilty, and you
admit that you did all the acts charged? A.
13. Have you been abused, mistreated, or threatened by anyone to have you enter your
plea(s) (or to enter any one of them)? A.
14. (Memorandum of Sentence):
15. You are now told that the suspension of the sentence(s) may be revoked and thejudgment(s)
and sentence(s) enforced, without suspension:
I. If you violate any City, State or Federal laws;
2. If you should be in possession of narcotic durgs;
3. If you habitually associate with convicted felons, or with lewd or vicious persons;
4. If you indulge in vicious habits;
5. If you leave the State of Oklahoma without first having received written permission of
the Corrections Officer to do so;
6. If you fail to report in writing to the Corrections Department as directed by them;
7. If you fail to pay the Court costs incurred herein, if and when ordered by the Correc-
tions Department; or
8. If you fail to make restitution when ordered by the Corrections Department:
16. Do you fully understand the terms of your suspended sentence, as just read to you, and as
set forth herein, and do you agree to abide by and obey these rules, and cooperate with the officers
of the Corrections Department, and obey their rules, in the supervision of your suspended sentence,
so long as the same is in force? A.
17. You have the right to file a petition in the Court of Criminal Appeals for a Writ of Certior-
ari, that is a request for the Court to review this judgment and sentence. It may be granted or
denied. Do you understand that? A.
18. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari must be filed in the Court of Criminal Appeals within
ninety (90) days from this date. Notice of such filing must be given within five (5) days thereafter
by serving a copy of the petition for Writ of Certiorari on the prosecuting attorney, who prosecuted
petitioner, and on the Attorney-General. Do you understand that? A.
19. Have you fully understood the questions that have just been asked you, and the answers
you have given to each question, and are they your free and voluntary answers to these questions
as made? A.
20. Above done in open Court this - day of _19-
21. (This is to be filed in the case as a part of the trial minutes).
APPROVED:
Assistant District Attorney DISTRICT JUDGE
Attorney for Defendant OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER PRESENT
The Defendant DEPUTY COURT CLERK PRESENT
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Summary No. 3 February, 1970
IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
OKLAHOMA COUNTY. STATE OF OKLAHOMA
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Plaintiff, ) No.)
vs. ) No.
Defendant.
Plea of Guilt;': Deferred Sentence: Summary
(one or more cases)
I Is the name just read to you your true name? A.
2 How old are you now? A. years of age.
3. Is Mr. your lawyer? A.
4 You know you are charged with
__2 A.
5 Have you and your lawyer had a copy of the charge(s)? A.
6. Do you know that the maximum punishment provided for the crime(s) is imprisonment for
years and that the minimum is imprisonment for years? A.
7. Do you understand that on plea(s) of guilty you may be sentenced to a term of imprison-
ment within these limits? A.
8. You know that you are entitled to a jury trial on the charge(s)? Do you waive a jury
trial? A.
9. Have you talked over the case with your lawyer, understand your rights and had his ad-
vice in the matter(s)? A.
10 Do you wish to enter your plea(s) now and to be sentenced at a later date? A.
I I What is your plea(s)? A.
12. Do you plead guilty of your own free will, only for the reason that you are guilty, and you
admit you did the acts charged? A.
13. Have you been abused, mistreated, or threatened by anyone to have you enter this
plea? A.
14 You are directed to appear personally before me, or in my absence, before a Judge of this
Court on the - day of 19......._, at - o'clock __....m.
Defendant released on to appear as set out herein.
15 You are now told that the deferring of the sentence(s) may be revoked and a judgment
and sentence given you prior to the above date on your plea(s) of guilty entered this date:
I. I f you violate any City, State or Federal laws;
2. 1 fyou should be in possession of narcotic drugs;
3. I f you habitually associate with convicted felons, or with lewd or vicious persons;
4. I f you indulge in vicious habits;
5. If you leave the State of Oklahoma without first having received written permission
of the Corrections Officer to do so;
6 If you fail to report in writing to the Corrections Department as directed by them;
7. If you fail to pay the Court costs incurred herein, if and when ordered by the Correc-
tions Department; or
8. If you fail to make restitution if and when ordered by the Corrections Department -
16, Do you understand the terms of your deferred sentence, as just read to you, and as set out
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herein, and do you agree to abide by and obey these rules, and cooperate with the officers of the
Corrections Department, and obey their rules, in the supervision of your deferred sentence so
long as the same is pending? A.
17. Have you understood the questions that have just been asked you and the answers you have
given to each question, and are they your free and voluntary answers to the questions as made?
A.
18. Done in open Court this - day of ,19- .
19. (This to be filed in the case as a part of the trial minutes).
APPROVED:
Assistant District Attorney DISTRICT JUDGE
Attorney for Defendant OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER PRESENT
The Defendant DEPUTY COURT CLERK PRESENT
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF TH E
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR CALHOUN COUNTY
FLORIDA
STATE OF FLORIDA
-vs-
Defendant
WA I VER AND CONSENT
I, the undersigned Defendant, accused of violation of Sec. , Florida
Statutes, hereby acknowledge that I have been orally informed in open Court this day of certain
legal rights and other information and this arraignment, namely;
I. I have been advised of the nature of the charges against me and acknowledge a receipt
of a copy of these charges and have had sufficient time to discuss these charges with my attorney
who is present with me here in Court and who has explained to me every accusation therein. He
has also advised me that the maximum penalty for the offense for which I am charged is as follows:
years orS __ fine or both.
2. 1 understand that I have a right to have a trial of my case before a petit or trial jury, wherein
the jury will determine whether or not I am guilty of these offenses. I knowingly give up and waive
my right to have a jury trial.
3. 1 further acknowledge that I have been advised that probation may or may not be granted
and no person, officer, agent, or any official or any branch of the Government, Federal State or
otherwise, nor my Attorney, has made any promises or suggestions of any kind to me, or to anyone
else within my knowledge, that if I would plead guilty to the charges. I would receive a light
sentence, probation, or any other form of leniency by the Court.
4. My plea entered here today is given freely and voluntarily of my own free will and accord,
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solely to confess my guilt, and no one has forced, threatened, persuaded, promised, induced or
otherwise influenced me to enter my plea to these charges.
5. 1 acknowledge before the Court that I have not been mistreated in any manner by any
person; that I am satisfied with the services and advice of my attorney and I have no questions to
ask the Court and no statement to make to the Court except to enter my plea of Guilty to these
charges.
Attorney for Defendant Defendant
APPROVED;
Circuit Judge
* Indictment" also includes "Information".
* The defendant's plea of "GUILTY" or "NOT GUILTY" to each offense should be entered
in the blank space provided in paragraph (10). If the indictment charges a single offense, a defen-
dant who wishes to plead "GUILTY" should write in paragraph (10) "GUILTY" as charged in
the indictment." If more than one offense is charged, the defendant may write in paragraph
(10) "Guilty as charged in Count _ " etc. "'Not Guilty as charged in Count
etc.
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